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"The property tax is one of the most maligned and least understood subjects of
public and official discussion today."
Ralph Nader
Testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations
May 9, 1972***
I. INTRODUCTION
Public education in the United States is a big business. In the fall of
2011, more than 55.5 million students from kindergarten through 12th
grade were expected to enroll in the nation's public schools at a total cost
of $599,145,678,000.2 Though it is a service provided by local govern-
ments, its cost is borne by local,3 state,4 and, to a more limited extent, feder-
al5 taxpayers. Providing public education is a massive undertaking and no
one level of government can solely bear its cost.
Governmental revenue sources, from which allocated shares of expense
are presently borne, differ.6 Local funding is provided predominately
through taxes on real property, state funding comes primarily from individ-
ual income or retail sales taxes, and federal contributions are from income
taxes.7 Funding public education is a perpetual challenge, and the 2008 re-
cession further complicated the situation. Indeed, the recession has made it
difficult to maintain even the status quo, and recently states have almost
... Property Tax Relief and Reform Act of 1973, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Intergovernmen-
tal Relations of the Committee on Government Operations United States Senate, 93rd Congress, First
Session, May 2,3, and 4, 1973.
' U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FACTS FOR FEATURES - BACK TO SCHOOL: 2011-2012 (2011)
http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/facts for features-special editions/cbl1-ffl5.html
(last visited Aug. 19, 2013).
2 MARK DIXON, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PUBLIC EDUCATION FINANCES: 2011, TABLE 1 SUMMARY OF
PUBLIC ELEMENTARY-SECONDARY SCHOOL SYSTEM FINANCES BY STATE: FISCAL YEAR 2011 1, avail-
able at http://www2.census.gov/govs/school/1 f-33pub.pdf.
Id. (explaining that for fiscal year 2011, local sources provided slightly more than $259,490,000,000 to
finance public elementary-secondary schools.); supra note 2, at 55 ( establishing that this constituted
43.3% of all revenues).
4 Id. at Table 1 (stating that for fiscal year 2011, state sources provided $265,948,389,000 to finance
public elementary-secondary schools.); id., at 5, Table 5 (establishing that this constituted 44.4% of all
revenues).
5 Id. at Table 1 (stating that for fiscal year 2011, the federal government provided $73,706,695,000 to
finance public elementary-secondary schools.); id. at 5, Table 5 ( establishing that this constituted 12.3%
of all revenues).
6 Federal Education Budget Project, Federal, State, and Local K-12 School Finance Overview, NEW
AMERICA FOUNDATION, http://febp.newamerica.net/background-analysis/school-finance.
7 Id.
' MICHAEL LEACHMAN, CHRIS MAI, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, MOST STATES
FUNDING SCHOOLS LESS THAN BEFORE RECESSION (2013), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/9-12-
13sfp.pdf.
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universally reported cuts in their share of support for education.9 The trend
toward diminished funding for public education must be arrested and re-
versed. 0 In seeking that reversal, policymakers must be aware of the differ-
ences among funding sources; property, income, and retail sales taxes do
not share the same characteristics. The differing characteristics contribute to
funding complexities and must be accommodated in order to work toward
an optimal package.
II. SAN ANTONIO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT V.
RODRIGUEZ
In 1973, the Supreme Court handed down its watershed school finance
decision: San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez." The
Court found that a public school-financing system based on local property
taxes did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause,
stark resultant funding disparities notwithstanding. 12 The plaintiffs in Ro-
driguez unsuccessfully argued that education is a fundamental right under
the United States Constitution and that a school funding system predicated
upon local property taxes that impacted lower income groups created a sus-
pect classification subject to strict scrutiny thereunder. 13
Unlike the federal constitution, state constitutions guarantee the estab-
lishment of a public education system for state residents. 14 As a result of the
Rodriguez decision, state courts became the exclusive forum in which ques-
tions of public school funding were litigated and the property tax remained
at that litigation's center. This was likely inevitable for several reasons.
First, the property tax provided the majority of financial support for k-12
public education nationally when Rodriguez was decided." Second, the tax
was already drawing taxpayer vitriol as a result of ongoing litigation in Cal-
ifornia. 16 Challenges to funding disparities stemming from reliance on prop-
9 Id.
10 Id.
1 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
12 Id. at 29.
' Id.
14 John Dayton & Anne Dupre, School Funding Litigation: Who's Winning the War?, 57 VAND. L. REV.
2351, 2356 (2004).
' From 1957 to 1977, school expenditure data were collected and published as a part of the Annual
Government Finance Survey. Those data were reported in dollar amounts. Beginning with the 1978-79
academic year, the Bureau of the Census began to report distribution of Public School System General
Revenue data by State in percentage terms. By that time, five years after San Antonio vs. Rodriguez was
decided by the United States Supreme Court, nationally on average approximately 45% of funding for
public schools was being provided by states. Despite the shift in reporting format, the patterns of sup-
port and expenditure are roughly comparable.
16 See Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Cal. 1971) [hereinafter Serrano I].
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erty tax revenues for funding were at the heart of California's Serrano cas-
es.17 In Serrano 1,18 two years before Rodriguez, the California Supreme
Court held that the state's method of school funding violated the equal pro-
tection clause in both the United States and California constitutions. Five
years after Rodriguez was decided, the California Supreme Court in Serra-
no Il19 held that state's method of school funding unconstitutional based
solely on the California constitution. By then, challenges to school funding
were completed or underway in a number of other states. 20 Further, political
discourse in the 1970s was powerfully influenced by a nationwide anti-tax
sentiment. 21 Congress had held hearings in 1973 in conjunction with failed
Senate Bill 1255, "a bill to provide for a program of assistance to state gov-
ernments in reforming their real property tax laws and providing relief from
real property taxes for low-income individuals, and for other purposes." 22
These hearings were merely the tip of the iceberg; anti-tax activity was nas-
cent in a number of states with California once again in the forefront of that
movement. 2 3 Finally, the Supreme Court may have inadvertently contribut-
ed to the intensive focus on the elimination or modification of the tax as the
heart of the funding disparities by virtue of critical comments made in
handing down the Rodriguez decision. Justice Powell, in concluding the
majority opinion noted that the Court had not placed its "judicial imprima-
tur on the status quo."2 He continued: "[t]he need is apparent for reform in
tax systems which may well have relied too long and too heavily on the lo-
cal property tax"25 (emphasis added).
The cumulative effect of this broadly targeted negative sentiment has
played a role in limiting the perceived range of options for school finance in
the four decades since Rodriguez was decided. Whether well-advised or not,
questions of finance from that point to the present have consistently treated
limiting reliance on the use of the property tax as a primary objective. I
'7 Kirk Stark & Jonathan Zasloff, Tiebout and Tax Revolts: Did Serrano Really Cause Proposition 13?,
50 UCLA L. REv. 801, 804 (2003).
* Serrano I, at 1244.
' Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 957-58 (Cal. 1976), supplemented, 569 P.2d 1303 (Cal. 1977) [here-
inafter Serrano II].
20 See e.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 291 (N.J. 1973) (explaining the "thorough and efficient"
standard required equal educational opportunity); see also Olsen v. Oregon, 554 P.2d 139, 140 (Or.
1976).
21 E.g., Robert F. Messinger, The Golden State v. the Silver State or State Taxation of Nonresidents'
Pension Income, 2 ELDER L.J. 97, 98 (1994).
22 Property Tax Relief and Reform Act of 1973: Hearing on S.B. 1255 Before the Subcomn. on Intergov-
ernmental Relations of the S. Comm. on Gov't Operations, 93d Cong. (1973).
23 See generally DAvID 0. SEARS & JACK CITRIN, TAX REVOLT: SOMETHING FOR NOTHING IN
CALIFORNIA 2 (1928).
24 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 58 (1973).
25 Id.
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submit that this strategy is currently proving particularly costly for public
education. Additional support for public education can be realized with the
property tax as an important part of that calculus and without imposing an
undue additional burden on taxpayers.
The need to successfully address the present financial structure is clear.
Currently available data helps establish that both inter-state 26 and intrastate27
funding gaps persist for public education. Each level of government has
continued to experience financial difficulties as the national economy con-
tinues to slowly rebound from the 2008 recession, a slow recovery that is
expected to persist. 28 This economic reality jeopardizes any hope of achiev-
ing equity29 over the long-term and more immediately threatens strides that
have been made towards adequacy.30 As one commentator put it: "Real con-
cerns exist that state budget shortfalls will result in the type and magnitude
of cuts in k-12 state aid that will either create or exacerbate inequities in re-
sources available to those students most at risk of academic failure."31 Fur-
ther, reports reflecting levels of expenditure for public education for the last
few years are gloomy; many states are cutting back on support.3 2
26 See THE EQUITY AND EXCELLENCE COMM' N, FOR EACH AND EVERY CHILD -- A STRATEGY FOR
EDUCATION EQUITY AND EXCELLENCE 18 (2013) ("Wide disparities in funding levels among the states
ranged from a low of $6,454 per pupil in Utah to $18,167 in New York in 2010.") (citing NAT'L CTR.
FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES FOR PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY
EDUCATION: SCHOOL YEAR 2009- 10 (FISCAL YEAR 2010) 11-12 (2012)).
27 See id. ("Funding also varies across districts within states. In most states, the highest-spending dis-
tricts pay about twice as much per pupil as the lowest-spending districts. In some states, like California,
the ratio is more than 3-to-1.").
28 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, STATE AND LOCAL GOV'T'S FISCAL OUTLOOK 1 (April 2013
Update), available at www.gao.gov/assets/660/654255.pdf ("The state and local government sector con-
tinues to face near-term and long-term fiscal challenges which add to the nation's overall fiscal chal-
lenges. As shown in figure 1, the state and local sector faces a gap between revenue and spending and
long-term fiscal challenges that grow over time. The model's simulation shows that the fiscal position of
the sector will steadily decline through 2060 absent any policy changes.") The model attributes looming
fiscal difficulties for the state and local sector to rapidly rising health care costs. It does not speak to the
expense of providing public education at all. It assumes, in general, constancy in policies presently in
place across state and local governments.
29 I define "equity" to mean that the base amount set for each school district's per-pupil funding is sup-
plemented to the extent necessary in order to address variations in educational needs and socioeconomic
conditions. As such, it is not predicated upon absolute equality in comparative expenditures. See News
from the Access Network, California Legislature Approves Reform Funding Legislation, National Edu-
cation Access Network, July 10, 2013, at 2.
3o "Adequacy" here means that level of expenditure sufficient to provide a sound basic education. In
practice, its content will vary from state to state. See MICHAEL A. REBELL, EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY,
DEMOCRACY, AND THE COURTS 235 (2001), available at http://www.schoolfunding.info/resource ce-
nter/research/adequacychapter.pdf.
" See Faith E. Crampton & David C. Thompson, The Road Ahead for School Finance Reform: Legisla-
tive Trends 2011 and Beyond, 37 J. EDUC. FIN. 185, 196 (2011).
32 See PHIL OLIFF, CHRIS MAI & MICHAEL LEACHMAN, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, NEW
SCHOOL YEAR BRINGS MORE CUTS IN STATE FUNDING FOR SCHOOLS 1 (2012), available at
www.cbpp.org/files/9-4-12sfp.pdf (The report indicates that school funding has now fallen below pre-
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Funding for the support of public education can be stabilized. Because
support of public education is a classic example of fiscal federalism in ac-
tion, I use this issue as a case study and identify ways in which the effort to
achieve stable equitable funding for public schools has been undermined on
the local, state, and federal levels of government as a result of both deliber-
ate policies and unintended consequences. Moreover, I submit that financial
stabilization can be achieved without identifying new sources of funding.
Instead, stabilization must have at its base a revitalized ad valorem property
tax; state resources that reliably defray local shortfalls; and federal assis-
tance that supports the subnational effort.
I describe how this can be accomplished. Briefly, policy makers must be
attuned to the characteristics of policy possibilities and revenue capacities
on each level of government. This process implicates a basic understanding
of the property, retail sales, and income taxes. Policy-makers must under-
stand how present financial practices and decisions undermine local and
state financial capacity. Issues of ultimate administration of the property tax
must be highlighted and resolved in a complimentary manner. Finally, I dis-
tinguish between the challenges of establishing and maintaining appropriate
support of public education that is stable enough to withstand the financial
stresses uniquely and inextricably a part of cyclical economic behavior, es-
pecially economic downturns, and management during periods of greater
economic exigency. I conclude by identifying complimentary actions policy
makers should take on each level of government in order to respond appro-
priately to the differing challenges of this reimagined mutual effort.
III. SCHOOL FUNDING AFTER RODRIGUEZ:
FROM INADEQUATE LOCAL AUTONOMY TO PROBLEMATIC
FISCAL FEDERALISM
Efforts to reform finance of public education have both succeeded and
failed in the state courts.33 In the aftermath of Rodriguez, most states took
recession levels with thirty-five states providing less funding per student than they did five years ago).
" See David Card & A. Abigail Payne, School Finance Reform, the Distribution of School Spending,
and the Distribution of Student Test Scores, 83 J. PUB. ECON. 49, 52-54 (2002) (showing that from 1975
to 1991, twelve state Supreme Courts found their school financing systems unconstitutional: Arkansas,
California, Connecticut, Kansas, Kentucky, Montana, New Jersey, Texas, Washington, West Virginia,
Wisconsin and Wyoming. Courts in fifteen states found the system satisfied the state constitution: Ari-
zona, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina. In twenty-one states, there was either no
decision or no challenge: Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and Virginia); NAT'L EDUC. ACCESS NETWORK, LITIGATION
CHALLENGING CONSTITUTIONALITY OF K-12 FUNDING IN THE 50 STATES (2013), available at
http://schoolfunding.info/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Litigations-Challenging-Constitutionality-of-K-
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steps to reform funding of public education addressing in some fashion
poorer school districts' ability to be self-sustaining because of property
wealth disparities, sometimes irrespective of the litigation outcome.3 4 Alt-
hough, the federal government continued to provide financial assistance
federal funds did not constitute a significant percentage of monies spent.35
Thus changes in the allocation of responsibility for funding public educa-
tion, though comparatively uneven from state to state, followed in Rodri-
guez's wake.36
As states assumed a larger role in funding public education, whether in
the wake of litigation or shifting policy, the objective evolved from equality
12-Funding.pdf, (as of July 2013, of the twenty-one states in the "no decision or no challenge" category,
there remained only five states in which K-12 funding remained unchallenged: Delaware, Hawaii, Mis-
sissippi, Nevada, and Utah.); NAT'L EDUC. ACCESS NETWORK, "EQUITY" AND "ADEQUACY" SCHOOL
FUNDING LIABILITY COURT DECISIONS (2013), available at http://schoolfunding.info/wp-
content/uploads/2011/07/'Equity'-and-'Adequacy'-School-Funding-Decisions-by-Outcome2.pdf, (for
this same group of states, plaintiffs have pressed winning claims in Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, and Vermont.). In short, matters of school finance remain heavily litigated.
3 Card & Payne, supra note 33, at 55, (showing data that refers to the states in which there had been
litigation between 1975 and 1991. In the twelve states in which the school financing system had been
held unconstitutional, five changed their systems. Changes were made in twelve of the fifteen states
finding no constitutional violation. For the twenty-one states in which there had been no challenge,
twelve changed their financing systems); id. at 67 (showing that the extent of change varied dependent
upon whether or not there had been a finding of unconstitutionality. Though many states increased the
extent to which state aid was allocated to low-income districts, the per student gap in state aid was
greater where the financing system was found unconstitutional with statistically significantly greater aid
going to low-income districts. Put slightly differently, states provided more aid to poorer districts in this
group of states); see also Jeffrey S. Sutton, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez and
Its Aftermath, 94 VA. L. REv. 1963, 1971-72 (2008) ("In the years before Rodriguez, and in the thirty-
five years since, most state legislatures embraced wealth -equalization formulas for funding their public
schools. Most states, whether before Rodriguez or after, adopted a foundation program, which represent-
ed a first step toward addressing property-wealth variations by guaranteeing a minimum amount of
combined state and local funding regardless of how little money a school district contributed. By the
mid-1970s, 18 states had improved on foundation programs by embracing variations on the "district
power equalizing" approach advocated in Rodriguez.").
1 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, BUDGET ISSUE PAPER, ELEMENTARY, SECONDARY, AND VOCATIONAL
EDUCATION: AN EXAMINATION OF ALTERNATIVE FEDERAL ROLES 11 (1977), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/defaulUfiles/cbofiles/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11375/1977 01 vocational.pdf (show-
ing that from 1963-64 to 1975-76, federal support for all elementary and secondary schools ranged from
4.5% to 7.0%. In 1973-74, the federal contribution constituted 7.3% of such expenditures. The largest
federal infusion of funds during this period occurred in 1971-72 when federal funds constituted 8.6% of
expenditures by all elementary and secondary schools).
1 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE 524 (Robert D. Ebel & John
E. Peterson, eds. 2012) (describing in one source the reactions to lawsuits across the states as follows:
"First, not all lawsuits were favorable to the plaintiffs. One reason that courts sometimes rejected
school-funding lawsuits was that policy judgments about public education were the responsibility of the
state legislature. For example, the highest court in Massachusetts observed, "Because decisions about
where scarce public money will do the most good are laden with value judgments, those decisions are
best left to our elected representatives." Second, not all state legislatures reconstructed their school fi-
nance systems in response to a court mandate. In Ohio, where the school finance system was first ruled
unconstitutional in 1997, as of 2007 the legislature had yet to reconstruct its school funding system. Fi-
nally, some states, such as Michigan, chose to reconstruct their school finance systems without being
mandated to do so by a school-funding lawsuit.").
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to adequacy and, beyond mere adequacy, adequacy with equitable over-
tones. An exhaustive discussion of the equality vis-h-vis adequacy or ade-
quacy with equity evolution is well beyond the scope of this essay but a
very rudimentary understanding of that evolution is useful. The initial aspi-
rational objective of increased state funding, from the standpoint of the
plaintiffs in Serrano and Rodriguez, was absolute equality in public school
expenditures.3 7 In order to close the funding gap between the richest and
poorest school districts and provide educational opportunity regardless of
the child's zip code, plaintiffs in this first wave of school finance cases
sought to compel each state to provide an equal amount of support for each
and every child. Equality per se, whether for financial or political reasons,
did not become the norm.38
In the next wave of finance litigation, "adequacy" in financial support
became the goal; local support supplemented by the state so as to enable
each public school district to provide some legislatively determined mini-
mal level of education.39 Adequacy and equality are not necessarily co-
extensive. Once adequate expenditures as determined under state policy are
deemed attained, state funding responsibility ends. Individual school dis-
tricts remain free to spend additional amounts as they wish to in support of
local schools. As matters presently stand, and regardless of the extent to
which states moved to close their respective financial gaps, "adequacy" in
funding appears to have become the prevailing standard. In general, a ma-
jority of states provided, and continue to provide, some pre-determined
minimum support per student through foundation programs, even though
the level of support is never stated in absolute dollar terms. 40 Many states,
" See Serrano II, 557 P.2d at 964 (Clark, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority had effectively re-
quired "absolute equality" in education); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 337 F. Supp. 280,
285-86 (1971).
" Jeffrey S. Sutton, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez and Its Aftermath, 94 VA. L.
REv. 1963, 1982 (2008) (with the caveat that "equity" should more accurately be read as "equality" in
the following passage, one writer characterizes the policy and political choices to be made in this way:
"[A]ny policymaker or court that wants true equity must establish not just a rational floor of
adequate school-district spending but a ceiling as well. True equity, indeed, requires that floor and the
ceiling to be the same, or at least close to the same after accounting for cost-of-living differences within
a State. But a ceiling requires capping of some sort, and the States that have tried it have gotten no-
where. Whether it was California, Washington, Colorado or Vermont, all either lacked the political will
to enforce the ceiling or slipped too many loopholes into the capping laws to establish meaningful equi-
ty.").
"See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 195 (Ky. 1989); see also Augenblick et
al., Equity and Adequacy in School Funding, 7 FuTuRE OF CHLDREN 63, 69 (1997).
40 Id. at 65 (noting the foundation program guaranteeing some minimal per pupil expenditure as a start-
ing point is the chosen mechanism for achieving this purpose in most states); see also Deborah A. Ver-
stegen & Robert C. Knoeppel, From Statehouse to Schoolhouse: Education Finance Apportion-
ment Systems in the United States, 38 J. EDUC. FIN. 145, 150-54 (2012) (noting Profs. Verstegen and
Knoeppel describe the major state finance systems now in place. They include Foundation Programs (36
states); District Power Equalizing (3 states); Full State Funding (1 state); Flat Grant (1 state); and a
8
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however, tailored adequacy to require something more than minimal ade-
quacy.41 As the states raised standards, foundation funding was increased in
a complimentary manner.42 Finally, that support varied dependent upon the
general character of the school district, for example, rural vs. urban.43 As
such, where this factor was considered, states further supplemented local
financing in order to subsidize costs of living differentials. 44
Regardless of the standard in place, however, adequacy implemented
simply by providing some pre-determined amount of support, even as ad-
justed to take district developmental character into account, that is, urban
vs. rural, was questioned. The seminal concern remained funding needs
driven by socioeconomic factors. 45 The hypothesis that equal amounts spent
in two different school districts with different socioeconomic characteristics
will quite likely generate different results has been addressed in a substan-
tial body of research. 46 Though there is no absolute consensus, the proposi-
tion that socioeconomic background appears to affect educational outcomes
is credible. 47 Students in underfunded districts continue to demonstrate
overall lower levels of achievement. 48 Poorer school districts are unable to
generate sufficient resources from district property tax rolls and need rela-
tively greater amounts from state resources in order to close the gap. 49 As
such, school districts serving concentrations of poorer children, poorly sup-
ported from local resources, will require relatively more support from state
sources in order to meet the declared standard than will schools in richer
districts.
A substantial minority of states began to address their perceived need for
comparatively higher funding needs for poorer school districts through
foundation plans that used either a minimal grant however defined as a
starting point (rather than a flat grant) or a variable grant approach.0 These
policy makers have begun to go beyond adequacy, perhaps in response to
judicial prodding, perhaps persuaded that there exists a link between spend-
combination approach (9 states)).
41 See Verstegen & Knoeppel, supra note 40, at 150-56.
42 Id. at 154.
43 Id. at 155.
44 Id. at 152.
45 See Card & Payne, supra note 33, at 56.
46 See, e.g., id. at 68 n.24.
47 See Robert H. Bradley & Robert F. Crown, Socioeconomic Status and Child Development, 53 ANN.
REV. PSYCHOLOGY 371, 375-77 (2002).
48 See Joe Rucklick, Kids in Underfunded Schools Score Lower on Tests, CHI. DEFENDER, Oct. 13, 2001,
at 1 available at http://search.proquest.com/docview/247069592/fulltext/1410857B492683305A9/-
12?accountid=14731.
49 See Verstegen & Knoeppel, supra note 40, at 146.
5o See Card & Payne, supra note 33, at 52-54.
2014] 557
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ing and educational outcomes. 1 In this subset of states minimal, but adjust-
able, foundation programs or variable grant programs contribute to the ef-
fort to move toward equity in school funding.5 2
Measuring the extent to which equity has been effectuated remains an
elusive task. It is quite difficult either to definitely establish an aggregate
cost for equity or to determine the extent to which it is actually achieved.53
Several different methods have been used in this attempt. Relatively
straightforward comparisons have considered local costs, local "effort," or
per-pupil expenditures adjusted for variations in student need.5 4 Alternative-
ly, the effort may also be deeply data intensive, predicated upon statistical
analyses of a variety of factors." One 1990 analysis, for example, conclud-
ed that no more than seven of the fifty states had achieved a high degree of
equity in educational finance.56 Relying upon a variety of approaches, a
2011 study concluded that while expenditure inequalities remain pervasive,
a handful of states have begun to somewhat close the gap. It reaches this
conclusion, however, much more cautiously than the 1990 report. 7 Two ca-
veats qualified the 2011 conclusion: the several analytical methods did not
overlap and policymakers and advocates may not have clearly identified
policy goals. 8 In fact, the list of states deemed to have made progress to-
wards greater equity varied dependent upon the evaluative method used.5 9
Despite that imprecision, this point was certain: though some states have
begun to address equity concerns, overall poorer school districts remain rel-
atively poorer.60 "Equity" in public education finance has been and likely
remains aspirational.
5' For a helpful discussion of this debate, see ANNA LUKEMEYER, COURTS AS POLICYMAKERS: SCHOOL
FINANCE REFORM LITIGATION 12-14 (2003).
52 See Card & Payne, supra note 33 at 52-53, Tablel.
5 This is necessarily the standard for comparison for two principal reasons: (1) there are no meaningful
national data allowing this kind of comparison to be made; and (2) intra-district data appear not to be
reported in a format permitting school-to-school comparisons. Id.
54 Bruce D. Baker et al., Is School Funding Fair? A National Report Card, 5 (Sept. 2010),
http://www.schoolfundingfairness.org/National Report Card.pdf.
5 Id at 7.
56See Augenblick et al., supra note 39, at 73. The latter comparison is predicated upon the coefficient of
variation. It measures the funding levels of all of the districts in a state and determines how tightly they
are clustered. The tighter the cluster, the greater the deemed degree of equity. As of 1990, these authors
report that "the level of equity was relatively high in 7 states; moderate in 38 states; and low in 4 states."
Id. If the data are analyzed slightly less generously, the numbers of states deemed to have achieved
moderate equity drops to 26 and those achieving low equity rises to 15.
5 Compare id. (concluding that seven states have high fiscal equity using a moderate measurement),
with Diana Epstein, Measuring Inequity in School Funding, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, 16-17 (Aug.
2011) (concluding that the data is incomplete and a more comprehensive measurement is needed).
5 Epstein, supra note 57, at 14.
5 Id.
6o See id. at 14-17. There is also a quite startling inter-state spread. For example, New York spends more
10
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Finally, as noted earlier, the federal role in financing public education
has remained quite limited from 1973 to the present.61 This level of in-
volvement is consistent with the federal role in k-12 public education over
time. The federal government has never assumed a direct significant finan-
cial role in supporting public education. The level of federal support pro-
vided through direct subsidies has been and remains in the ten percent
range. Further, federal support has historically been earmarked for particu-
lar programs, usually of a compensatory nature.6 2 This means that state and
local governments do not have unrestricted use of federal funds; subnation-
al use of federal funds to to tailor educational programs to meet specific lo-
cal needs has been circumscribed.6 3
Clearly, the present onus for funding public education is borne, though
unevenly, by all three levels of government. States have assumed financial
responsibility in a different manner after Rodriguez. From very substantial
reliance by local school districts on local property taxes for funding, in-
creased state participation in financial support for public education has
opened state tills.64 This expanded state role has stopped short of full fund-
ing, however; Hawaii is the only state that has assumed sole responsibility
for funding public education.65 In all other states, levels of participation
continue to evolve.
At a minimum, this very brief discussion establishes that determining
how and to what extent to fund public education remains a work in pro-
gress. Though equity concerns are being addressed in many states, equity
remains largely aspirational. Adequacy also remains, at best, under-
realized; states by their own terms have not yet succeeded in adequately ed-
ucating all of the students enrolled in their public schools. This is evidenced
in several ways. Internationally, American schoolchildren are increasingly
than $15,000 annually on its students; Tennessee spends slightly more than $8500. See id. at 5. In the
absence of a federal Constitutional right to education, however, this is not a primary focus.
61 Daphne A. Kenyon, Providing and Financing K-12 Education, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT 530 (Robert D. Ebel & John E. Petersen, eds., 2012).
62 See id. ([Federal support has been provided primarily through Title I] "to improve the academic
achievement of disadvantaged, poor children"); and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
("IDEA"). Id. Because these are categorical programs, continued receipt of these funds is predicated
upon documented use for the designated purposes. Id.
6 See id. This observation is predicated upon the assumption that pupil needs targeted through these
programs were not otherwise being met by states. There is the possibility that fungible state money that
would otherwise be used for these purposes could then be redirected to some other use - whether educa-
tional or not.
64 See Verstegen & Knoeppel, supra note 40, at 150-154 (2012). The major state finance systems now in
place include Foundation Programs (36 states); District Power Equalizing (3 states); Full State Funding
(1 state); Flat Grant (1 state); and a combination approach (9 states). Id. at 151.
65 Id.
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less competitive.66 Further, a troubling achievement gap persists as class-
rooms become increasingly segregated by race and socio-economic status.67
Students in underfunded districts continue to demonstrate overall lower lev-
els of achievement and poorer school districts remain relatively underfund-
ed.68
All of this has become even more difficult in the present economic envi-
ronment. Most recently, as the economic effects of the 2008 recession con-
tinue to reverberate, states and localities have been cutting funding for pub-
lic education.69 A short review of the characteristics of revenue streams on
each of the three levels of government usefully provides the context for un-
derstanding the inevitability of the current cutbacks.
IV. LESSONS FROM FISCAL FEDERALISM
There exists an important difference between funding sources for state
vis-h-vis local governments generally. Local governments continue to rely
to a significant degree on revenues from real property taxes in order to fund
public services. 70 These public services include public education, which is
arguably local government's single most important activity. In contrast,
states rely primarily on a combination of retail sales taxes and state individ-
ual taxes for revenues.71
66 See THE EQUITY AND EXCELLENCE COMM'N, U. S. DEP'T OF EDUC., FOR EACH AND EVERY CHILD -
A STRATEGY FOR EDUCATIONAL EQUITY AND EXCELLENCE 12-13 (2013), available at
http://www2.ed.gov/about/bdscomm/list/eec/equity-excellence-commission-report.pdf ("In the OECD's
Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) rankings for 2009, the United States was 27th
in math. ... In terms of 'advanced' performance on math, 16 countries produced twice as many high-
achievers per capita as the United States. Indeed, in mathematics, only one in four of America's 52 mil-
lion K-12 students is performing on par today with the average student in the highest-performing school
systems in the world - which are now in Singapore, Hong Kong, Finland, Taiwan and South Korea.").
67 See, e.g., GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, BROWN AT 50: KING'S DREAM OR PLESSY'S
NIGHTMARE? 3 (2004), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-educat-
ion/integration-and-diversity/brown-at-50-king20l9s-dream-or-plessy20l9s-nightmare/orfield-brown-
50-2004.pdf.
6 81 d. at 21-22.
69 See Michael Leachman & Chris Mai, Most States Funding Schools Less Than Before the Recession,
CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES 1 (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.cbpp.org/files/9-12-13sfp.pdf.
7o See, e.g., Gregory K. Ingram & Hal Woman, Foreword to EROSION OF THE PROPERTY TAX BASE:
TRENDS, CAUSES, AND CONSEQUENCES, at vii, vii (Nancy Y. Augustine, et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter
EROSION OF THE PROPERTY TAX BASE] ("The property tax is a major source of revenue for local gov-
ernments in the United States now comprising nearly half of own source revenue and underpinning the
provision of core local government services.").
7 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 287-89, Tables 452 &
453 (2012), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/12statab/stlocgov.pdf. Seven states do
not collect personal income: Alaska, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas , Washington, and Wyo-
ming. See id. at 289, Table 453. New Hampshire and Tennessee tax investment income but not wages
and salaries. Which States Rely on Which Tax, NAT'L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES 2,
12
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The revenue reliance difference has several important implications. Gen-
erally speaking, the base for the property tax is the fair market value of
property annually determined. 72 The cyclical nature of base determination
means less volatility in revenues generated therefrom. In short, though an
economic downturn may bring with it reduced real property values, because
property values are annually assessed, declines in value will take a cycle or
two to become extant. There will be some lag time between economic
slowdown and decline in property value. For this reason, revenues from
property taxes will remain more stable during recessionary periods and, de-
pendent upon the depth of recessionary activity, property taxes may be en-
tirely inured from reduced productivity.
On the other hand, retail sales taxes and income taxes are much more
volatile. 73 As employment levels stagnate or unemployment rises, incomes
diminish. 74 Inevitably, diminished economic activity reduces consumer
spending, and income tax collections and state revenues correspondingly
decline. Further, the decline is likely to be both much more immediate and
more precipitous than would be true in the case of the property tax. In short,
the property tax is relatively more inelastic and less volatile than income
and retail sales taxes. These characteristics manifestly affect public school
funding.
As noted earlier, post Rodriguez states moved toward assuming signifi-
cantly increased funding responsibility for public education though local
property tax revenues continued to provide a substantial portion of funds
expended.75 The realignment of funding sources, however, brought with it
the risks inextricably intertwined with a given revenue source. In this in-
stance, property tax funding, which proved relatively stable, though inade-
quate, because of sometimes great variations in the value of underlying tax
rolls, was increasingly supplemented and in Hawaii replaced entirely by
state funding that has proven more generous but also more volatile. In short,
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/fiscal/WhichStatesRelyonWhichTax.pdf (last visited Oct. 11. 2013). On
average, personal income taxes constitute thirty-seven percent of all state revenues. See id. at 288-89,
Table 453. Forty-five states currently tax general sales; Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire
and Oregon do not. See id. at 288, Table 453. On average, one third of state revenues are derived from
sales taxes. See id. The balance of collections is from property, corporate, excise, and severance taxes
and a variety of fees and charges. See id. at 288-89, Table 453.
72 Woods Bowman et al., Preferential Treatment of Property Used for Social Purposes: Fiscal Impacts
and Public Policy Implications, in EROSION OF THE PROPERTY TAX BASE, supra note 70, at 270.
7 Elizabeth McNichol, Strategies to Address the State Tax Volatility Problem: Eliminating the State
Income Tax Not a Solution, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES 1, 3, 11 (Apr. 18, 2013),
http://www.cbpp.org/files/4-18-13sfp.pdf.
74 Id. at 3.
7 See Card & Payne, supra note 33, at 52-53; Verstegen & Knoeppel, supra note 40, at 150-52.
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reliance on state sources of revenue simultaneously provided increased
funding for public education and introduced unanticipated funding instabil-
ity as state economies expanded and contracted in sync with the national
economy.
The effect of this endemic volatility in state revenue has been clearly ev-
idenced by recent reductions in support. 76 The most recent prolonged eco-
nomic downturn has provided a particularly trenchant example of the finan-
cial perils of relying heavily on state revenues for support of public
education. This effect would have quite likely gone unnoticed in the years
following Rodriguez; prior to the most recent recession the national econo-
my had consistently expanded with relatively short periods of contraction.77
State economies tracked the national economy.71
V. THE PRESENT LOCAL-STATE FUNDING ENVIRONMENT
In a best case scenario state and local governments could, as partners, re-
negotiate the terms of public school finance making the financial accom-
modations necessary to stabilize funding. Ideally, any effort to stabilize
funding would be predicated upon an informed accommodation of the com-
parative characteristics of revenue sources thus avoiding a reprise of the
patterns of reliance that have led to the current financial troubles. This sce-
nario is not possible in the present environment. In the four decades that
have elapsed since Rodriguez, monumental shifts in the fiscal relationship
between states and locals as well as significant changes in the relative polit-
ical power of the several players have occurred. Both sets of factors now
inevitably and profoundly affect the future of this.
A. States vis-a-vis Local Governments
1. Fierce Criticism of the Property Tax
Taxpayer resistance to the property tax ran deep during the 1970s and
Californians were at the epicenter of that unrest. 79 Opposition to the tax was
built on a coalition of taxpayers having varying complaints. One set of
property owners objected to rapidly escalating property tax burdens driven
76 OLIFF ET AL., supra note 32, at 1.
7See US Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions, NAT'L BUREAU ECON. REs., 1 (Apr. 23, 2012),
http://www.nber.org/cycles/USBusinessCycle Expansions and Contractions 20120423.pdf.
7 Cf. Rebecca M. Hendrick & James C. Garand, Variation in State Economic Growth: Decomposing
State, Regional, and National Effects, 53 J. POL. 1093, 1100-01 (1991).
9ALvIN RABUSHKA & PAULINE RYAN, THE TAX REVOLT 1-2 (1982).
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by rapidly appreciating assessed values subjected to unchanged tax rates."
On the other hand, litigation challenging unequal public school funding at-
tributable to underlying variations in property tax rolls resulted in the judi-
cial directive to redistribute "excess" collections to poorer school districts, a
prospect deemed completely unacceptable to another set of property own-
ers." California's Serrano decisions, ultimately finding constitutionally de-
ficient that state's reliance on the property tax to fund public education, are
thus thought by many to have played an important role in fomenting the
taxpayer resistance that ultimately led to that state's constitutional amend-
ment, popularly known as Proposition Thirteen.8 2 In 1978, through citizen
initiative, California amended the California constitution in a manner that
imposed significant limitations on the extent to which the property tax
could be utilized to fund local government in general. California was not
the only state in which taxpayers proactively sought collectively to limit
what was popularly perceived to be an unacceptably excessive property tax
burden.83 The California experience provided a catalyst to a movement that
had national ramifications. Comparable state-based taxpayer activity was
widespread during the early 1970s.8 4
There was also national fallout. During his 1972 State of the Union ad-
dress, President Richard Nixon declared that "[t]he property tax is one of
the most oppressive and discriminatory of all taxes" and later that year
pledged to "make my final recommendation for relieving the burden of
property taxes.""> In 1973 Congress held hearings on the property tax.86 The
importance of the tax as a revenue source was clear; local governments re-
lied almost exclusively on the tax for revenues. It is also clear, however,
that the tax was generally perceived to be a little understood administrative
disaster, deeply resented by taxpayers, characterized by administrative mis-
feasance (if not malfeasance), and with little transparency. Ralph Nader's
sOId. at 10-11.
I See William A. Fischel, Did Serrano Cause Proposition 13?, 42 NAT'L TAX J. 465,465 (1989).
82 Id. at 467 (discussing voter response to the landmark 1971 decision of Serrano v. Priest).
" TJ Holmes, Are You Paying Excessive Property Taxes?, CNN NEWSROOM, Apr. 4, 2010,
http://newsroom.blogs.cnn.com/2010/04/02/are-you-paying-excessive-property-taxes/.
8 See, e.g., Steven Hayward, The Tax Revolt Turns 20, POL'Y REV. 9, (1998) ("Within two years of [the
adoption of California's Proposition 13], 43 states implemented some kind of property-tax limitation or
relief, 15 states lowered their income-tax rates, and 10 states indexed their state income taxes for infla-
tion."); see also David M. Cutler et al., Restraining the Leviathan: Property Tax Limitation in Massa-
chusetts, 71 J. PUB. ECON. 313, 315 (1999) (discussing Proposition 2 and 2, a successful 1980 ballot
initiative to reduce property taxes). With regard to property tax limitations only, however, anti-tax activ-
ity has persisted. Prof. Sokolow reports that between 1970 and 1995, forty-two states adopted at least 68
measures likely surpassing the number of such measures in any comparable quarter in American history.
Alvin D. Sokolow, infra note 120, at 170.
85 Property Tax Relief and Reform Act of 1973, Hearings Before the Subcomni on Intergovernmental
Relations ofthe S. Comm. on Gov't Operations, 93d Cong. 788 (1973) [hereinafter Hearings].
86 Id. at 742-43.
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comments during an earlier set of hearings accurately summarized the litany
of complaints. Nader "charged that 'the property tax is one of the most ma-
ligned and least understood subjects of public and official discussion to-
day."'1 He contended that the property tax had become oppressive to
homeowners because, among other things, as applied it was "rife with cor-
ruption, favoritism, antiquated laws, and secrecy." 8
The recommendations made for improvement by Nader and others be-
came a matter of record but little else. The hearings contributed nothing to
the improvement of the tax. Despite strides to advance the administration of
the tax, no action was taken on "A Bill to Provide for a Program of Assis-
tance to State Governments in Reforming Their Real Property Tax Laws
and Providing Relief from Real Property Taxes for Low-Income Individu-
als, and for Other Purposes" offered by Mr. Muskie (D-Maine) and others. 89
Rather, at the end of the day, the hearings seemed only to have provided
grist for the "eliminate-the-property-tax" mill. Any chance on the federal
level to secure a commitment of resources to support the continuing profes-
sionalization of the tax's implementation and administration was lost.
In short, during this period proactive taxpayers initially located primari-
ly in states permitting citizen initiatives, such as California and Massachu-
setts, began and dominated a national debate that made property tax limita-
tion an urgent agenda item across the country.90 As described in the next
sections, the movement to limit the property tax literally took on a life of its
own in the vast majority of states, including non-initiative states.
2. The Loss of Local Control; State Appropriation of Property Tax
Policy
Against this backdrop, the developments in the states during the four
decades since 1973 are unsurprising. Legislative activity throughout that
period has been replete with the imposition of expansive tax and expendi-
ture limitations (TELs), cumulatively significantly diminishing the tax's
revenue productivity. Overall tax limitations have been enacted in virtually
every state and have been both general through, for example millage lim-
its,91 rate increase limits,92 assessment limitations; 93 and specific, 94 such as
8 Id.
" Id. at 743.
9 Id. at 241-61.
90 Glynn W. Fisher, History of Property Taxes in the United States, ECON. HISTORY,
http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/fisher.property.tax.history.us (last visited Sept. 18, 2013).
9' The property tax is determined in mills with one mill = 1/10 of a cent. See BLACKS's LAW
DICTIONARY 1084 (9th ed. 2009). For example, a parcel of taxable property with an assessed value of
$100,000 taxed by a governmental unit having a millage rate of 10 mills will have a property tax bill of
16
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relief targeted by age, disability, or military status. In addition, thirty-six
states impose limits on local jurisdictions' ability to generate revenues be-
yond some specified point, or to make expenditures.95 The cumulative effect
of the combination has been unavoidable. These changes have limited prop-
erty tax revenue potential, eroded the tax base, and undermined local ability
to meet rising costs incident to necessary services. Often these effects have
occurred in tandem.
In addition to these broadly cast limitations and targeted relief provi-
sions, states have enacted a smorgasbord of laws enabling a m6lange of
practices and initiatives.96 Many fall under the heading of economic revital-
ization. Some result in locally based initiatives, while others may originate
from state agencies.9 7 They all, however, share a common characteristic.
Like TELs, they, too, compromise the ability to use the property tax to sup-
port public education.
The seminal example of local projects compromising the use of the prop-
erty tax can be drawn from "Tax Increment Financing" (TIF) schemes. One
writer described TIFs as "the most widely used local government program
for financing economic development in the United States and the District of
Columbia."98 TIF programs have been implemented in forty-nine states, as
well as the District of Columbia and across all kinds of communities.99 In
brief, local governments use these programs to subsidize public infrastruc-
ture improvements incident to economic revitalization in some defined ar-
ea."'o Public costs for such improvements are met by first floating bonds to
$1,000 annually ($ 100,000x.0 1).
92 See generally Terri A. Sexton, Assessment Limits as a Means of Limiting Homeowner Property Taxes,
in EROSION OF THE PROPERTY TAX BASE, supra note 70, at 117, 118-25. (Assessment limits restrict the
extent to which the property tax base (the property's value) can be annually increased for property tax
purposes. While Proposition 13 limits the extent of annual increase to 2%, it is by no means the only
such limitation presently extant. The extent of base erosion will be driven by the divergence between
assessment cap and property appreciation. As the gap between these two values widens (lowering as-
sessment rate and increasing value in property), the rate of erosion in the base will accelerate).
Id. at 117, 118-25.
9 John H. Bowman, Residential Property Tax Relief Measures, in EROSION OF THE PROPERTY TAX
BASE, supra note 70, at 73, 91 n.29.
1 Bing Yuan et al., Tax and Expenditure Limitations and Local Public Finances, in EROSION OF THE
PROPERTY TAX BASE, supra note 70, at 149, 155.
96 Id. at 155.
9 Accord id., at 157.
9 See Richard Briffault, The Most Popular Tool: Tax Increment Financing and the Political Economy of
Local Government, 77 U. CHI. L. REv. 65, 65 (2010) (providing a general overview of tax increment
financing).
9 Id.
00 See id. at 78 (Of note, as originally designed, TIFs were intended to reverse blight. At present, how-
ever, the standard for establishment of a TIF has evolved to "something a lot more like 'underdevelop-
ment."').
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fund the project and then by using the increase in property tax collections to
pay the interest on those bonds (hence the term tax increment financing). In
short, the indebtedness is serviced by the anticipated increase in property
tax collections.01 Thus, as the effort matures and the assessed value of en-
compassed properties increases, increased collections are not collected by
the local government or other affected governmental entities for general
use. Instead, increases are earmarked for the enterprise. Without this diver-
sion, rising property values would produce increased tax revenues for the
use of the governmental entities having overlapping jurisdictional control.
Two TIF features merit emphasis here: (1) property owners continue to
bear liability for the total property tax including amounts levied against the
increased value, and (2) the governmental unit in which the TIF is located
freezes the assessment base of overlapping districts at pre-improvement
levels. 10 2 The ability to foreclose financial benefits to other entities has been
characterized as "[b]y far the greatest moral hazard posed by TIFs."103 Alt-
hough national data is not available, the amounts involved are likely sub-
stantial. One scholar commented on the absence of either state or national
data on the number of TIFs, but observed that studies suggest that the num-
ber of such districts could "reach well into the thousands." 10 4 Another schol-
ar reported that "[e]ven 10 years ago, California TIF districts were estimat-
ed to receive 10 percent of all property tax revenue in the state, or $2.1
billion annually, and to have accumulated $51 billion in bonded indebted-
ness."o5 In Chicago, where former Mayor Richard M. Daly declared TIF
"the only game in town," there were 162 TIFs in 2010, covering approxi-
mately 30% of the city's area and containing roughly 10% of the tax
base."106 That commenter reported that collections from TIF districts would
1o1 See id. at 66.
10 See Joan M. Youngman, TIF at a Turning Point: Defining Debt Down, ST. TAX NOTES, May 2, 2011,
at 321 ("TIFs can be invisible to taxpayers, because the assessor continues to value property as before
and the taxpayer continues to pay taxes in the same way. But tax collections are now divided between
the portion attributable to values in place at the time the TIF district was established and the portion that
represents value increases since then."), available at http://www.lincolninst.edu/subcenters/significant-
features-property-tax/upload/sources/ContentPages/documents/State%20Tax%20Notes%20-
%20TP.pdf.
103 Id. at 324.
'n Briffault, supra note 98, at 70.
105 Youngman, supra note 102, at 324; see also William Fulton, Op-Ed., Getting Real About Redevelop-
ment in California, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jan/12/opinion/la-oe-
fulton-redevelopment-20120112. (Governor Jerry Brown was successful in ending TIF initiatives in
California.)
106 ROBERT BRUNO & ALISON DICKSON QUESADA, TAX INCREMENT FINANCING AND CHICAGO PUBLIC
SCHOOLS: A NEW APPROACH TO COMPREHENDING A COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP, UNIVERSITY OF
ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN 4-5 (2011) available at http://www.ler.illinois.edullabor/ima-
ges/Bruno Quesada 12152011.pdf.
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exceed $500 million in 2010 and 2011.107 The substantial sums involved led
another Chicago commentator to suggest that increases in value incident to
the TIFs located there be allocated in their entirety to the support of the
city's public schools.ios
State approved programs that permit local governments to abate property
tax liability entirely are even more problematic because the opportunity to
collect tax revenue is entirely foregone. Abatement is the key element under
Stand Alone Property Tax Abatement Programs (SAPTAPs), as well as
other more broadly cast programs that incorporate this feature.109 The term
characterizes programs that afford, to qualifying business property, a partial
or complete forgiveness of property tax liability for some predetermined pe-
riod.o Two quite famous beneficiaries of such programs have been Mer-
cedes Benz and BMW,111 though there have been countless others.1 12
Nationally, such initiatives have become ubiquitous. A 2005 study
determined that at that time thirty-five states permitted some form of
SAPTAP. 113 This number was increased to forty-two in 2007, following the
identification of the seven states that included abatement as a part of a larg-
er economic initiative. 114 These programs remain controversial, as data have
not yet definitively established their effectiveness." That debate cannot be
resolved here, but this much is certain: local taxpayers may be denied an
opportunity for political input, but will nevertheless bear the burden of de-
'7 Id. at 7.
"o See Shari S. Lindsey, Comment, A Global-City Status at the Expense of Black and Latino Youth:
How Chicago's TIF Districts Disparately Impact CPS Students, 6 DEPAUL J. Soc. JUST. 23, 29 (2012).
1o' See Esteban G. Dalehite et al., Variation in Property Tax Abatement Programs Among States, 19
ECON. DEV. Q., 157, 158 (May 2005).
110 See Robert W. Wassmer, Property Tax Abatement as a Means of Promoting State and Local Eco-
nonic Activity, in EROSION OF THE PROPERTY TAX BASE, supra note 70, at 221, 222 (defining
"SAPTAP").
.. Adam M. Zaretzky, Are States Giving Away the Store? Attracting Jobs Can Be A Costly Venture,
THE REG'L ECON., (Sep. 10, 2013, 02:17 PM), http://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/re/ar-
ticles/?id=1875. The package offered to Mercedes Benz by the state of Alabama included a $300 mil-
lion plant (leased to Mercedes Benz for $100 annually); German language and culture classes for em-
ployees' children; and tax breaks worth at least $300 million. A comparable package was offered by the
state of South Carolina to BMW in a successful attempt to attract an automobile assembly plant.
112 Id.
" E.g., Dalehite, supra note 109, at 161-62.
1" See Wassmer, supra note 110, at 224.
"5 See Wassmer, supra note 110, at 224-25 (Arguments against SAPTAPs include questionable level of
influence of taxes on location decisions; effect of local pro-business expenditures; and the real possibil-
ity that enactments of SAPTAPS is a zero-sum game as more and more states jump onto the bandwagon.
Arguments supporting SAPTAPS focus on positive effect on business location decisions); see also Kirk
J. Stark & Daniel J. Wilson, What Do We Know About the Interstate Economic Effects of State Tax In-
centives, 4 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 133, 163-64 (2006) (suggesting that Congress "undertake a careful
and thorough evaluation of the nationwide effects of state tax incentives").
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fraying any incidental increased public costs.116 For example, employees,
suppliers, and patrons of the new plant will use local roads maintained by
local public works entities under the oversight of local law enforcement
agencies and will take advantage of water and sewer, and other general ser-
vices. In short, property owners will be entitled to all of the benefits of
property ownership in the affected area, including use at will, of these and
all other public amenities, but without the burdens of property taxation. As-
suming reasonably that the property owned by newcomers is of significant
value, foregone property tax collections could be substantial. It is important
to note that though there are exceptions, states rarely hold localities finan-
cially harmless under these schemes in spite of the expected overall en-
hancement in economic activity. Put slightly differently, a successful out-
come may enhance state revenues through increased state individual income
and retail sales tax collections, but local governments are left to defray in-
creased expense without any increase in available resources.
Additionally, practices limiting available resources for public education
seem particularly ill informed. Numerous studies have consistently identi-
fied an educated base from which to draw employees, as well as effective
schools in general as important state attributes for businesses.117 Limiting or
waiving property tax liability undermines a state's ability to invest in educa-
tion, a resource that has consistently proven important to stimulating eco-
nomic activity.' States would seem well advised to refrain from this kind
of counter-productive bargaining.
For all of these reasons, from what had been a source of revenue exclu-
sively under the control of local government, the property tax has devolved
into a source of revenue over which states have assumed significant politi-
cal control. Neither states nor local governments are being advantaged by
the tax's relative stability. Instead, the tax is consistently less productive in
overall percentage terms because of limitations imposed upon its use.119 The
"6 See generally DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006) (holding that Ohio taxpayers
lacked standing to sue to stop tax benefits despite the fact that Ohio taxpayers would bear a dispropor-
tionate burden of these tax benefits).
1" See generally Wassmer, supra note 110, at 228 ("[An] educated workforce some firms bring to a lo-
cality generate 'agglomeration economies' to local firms in the form of increased productivity (through a
greater exchange of ideas or a bigger pool of labor to draw from).. If the firm can reasonably locate
elsewhere, it is rational for the jurisdiction to offer an incentive up to the value of these benefits").
I" See generally Yuan, supra note 95, at 157 ("Local tax and expenditure limitations that target property
taxes, traditionally the major source of funding for public education, have led to spending cuts in public
schools, higher teacher-student ratios, limited starting teacher salaries, and declined teacher quality, all
of which are likely to compromise the quality of educational services.").
"' See Nancy Y. Augustine et al., The Property Tax Under Siege, in EROSION OF THE PROPERTY TAX
BASE, supra note 70, at 1, 2 ("Although the property tax is the largest single source of state and local
revenues, the extent of the decline of the property tax is clear. State and local governments raised $335.7
billion in property taxes in 2005, compared with $263 billion from the general sales tax and $240.9 bil-
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tax's potential productivity is further undermined by states' propensity to-
ward using property tax relief as one more bargaining chip in packages de-
signed to enhance economic activity.
3. The Local Effect of State Appropriation of Policy
Though local governments are clearly stakeholders in matters pertaining
to local finance, they have not played an influential role as these practices
have unfolded.120 In a federalist system of governance, local government of-
ficials should play an influential role during the legislative process on mat-
ters relating to the financial practices that directly affect local ability to
govern. Instead, as local control over the property tax has eroded, represent-
atives of local governments have increasingly been relegated to the role of
supplicants to the state having only the latitude afforded to onlookers. In
short, the intervening decades have been characterized by a monumental
shift in the dynamics of power in the states, and local governments have
been the losers. 121
The previous explanations did not speak to the limitations imposed upon
funding for public education. Nonetheless, understanding the effect of these
limitations is salient in this context precisely because public education is
generally not protected from the overall revenue limiting effects of practices
like those described. This is an important point; revenue loss attributable to
TELs may adversely affect factors generally considered indicative of the
quality of education. For example, though not irrefutable, credible data sup-
ports a strong inference that increased student-teacher ratios, lower teacher
salaries, and loss of experienced teachers, follow in the wake of TEL-
related reductions in funding. 122 The legislative failure to avoid this effect is
arguably at odds with the wishes of states' electorates. Available studies
lion from the personal income tax. Local property taxes accounted for 72.4 percent of local tax revenues
in 2005 and 45.8 percent of total local general own-source revenues. Fifty years ago, local property tax-
es raised $14.4 billion in local revenues, which accounted for 87.2 percent of local tax revenues and 69.5
percent of total local own-source general revenues.").
120 See generally Alvin D. Sokolow, The Changing Property Tax and State-Local Relations, 28 PUBLIUS
165, 165-67 (1998) ("State control over local government revenues has been increasing for more than
two decades. Restrictions on local use of the property tax, the traditional top revenue source for local
governments in the United States, contribute greatly to this trend .... [S]tate actions that eliminate or se-
verely reduce local control over the property tax undercut the political as well as the fiscal autonomy of
communities.").
121 See id. at 181 ("In many states...key decisions about local government revenues have been transferred
from local arenas to state capitols .... This [makes] local governments and the associations that represent
them.. .more vulnerable to circumstances beyond their control.").
122 See generally Yuan, supra note 95, at 162-67. "[C]ountrywide school district data...demonstrated that
local property tax limitations led to higher student-teacher ratios and lower starting salaries for teach-
ers." Id. at 163.
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suggest that, notwithstanding deep and undeniable public resistance to pay-
ing taxes in general, the majority of Americans continue to view public ed-
ucation, supported by the property tax, as a matter of paramount im-
portance. 123 While it remains difficult to sort out taxpayer preferences, this
sentiment emerges in spite of what appears to be a commonly held view
that government at all levels is too big.124 A compelling argument can be
made that public sentiment favors protecting funding for locally provided
public education from the effects of limitations as those described.
A handful of states have safeguarded school districts from the effects of
TIFs and SAPTAPs.125 Four of the SAPTAP states protect revenues for pub-
lic schools, as do eight of the TIF states. 126 Overall, however, state policy-
makers (and, perhaps, properly informed voters) have failed to provide ex
ante global protection for local governments in general, and school districts
in particular, during the TELs enactment process. 127
To bring this part of the discussion full circle, I submit that the argument
against the use of the property tax to finance public education has been only
partially correct in the last several decades. Without question, funding dis-
parities were inevitable because of wide variances, then and now, in the
value of underlying property. Challenges to the legality of those variations
were, and remain, warranted. Additionally, as the Congressional Hearings
of 1973 demonstrate, the property tax was much vilified during that period
due to administrative shortcomings. 128 Presently, the property tax is much
better administered, 129 but it has now been hobbled by an assortment of
limitations that compromise its revenue-generating potential. It is quite
probable that the present, more effectively administered, property tax would
123 See generally Bill Simonsen & Mark D. Robbins, Reasonableness, Satisfaction, and Willingness to
Pay Property Taxes, 38 URBAN AFFAIRS REV. 831, 844 (2003) (When asked about cutting services to
offset the tax loss, 67% of people said they would strongly oppose a service cut to public education);
Thomas I. Miller & Michelle A. Miller, Standards of Excellence: U.S. Residents'Evaluations of Local
Government Services, 51 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 503, 508 (1993) (Schools were ranked 8th in importance of
locally provided services); DAVID 0. SEARS & JACK CITRIN, TAX REVOLT: SOMETHING FOR NOTHING IN
CALIFORNIA 48, 49 (1982) ("[P]rograms whose benefits are available to everyone, at least in principle,
such as police and fire and schools, are more widely favored than those with more specialized clien-
teles....") (emphasis added).
124 See Sears, supra note 123, at 70 ("Americans in general, do seem to want 'something for nothing'
where government is concerned. They want smaller government and lower taxes, but they want to main-
tain or even expand services in most areas of state and local government responsibility.").
125 See NAT'L EDUC. ASS'N, PROTECTING PUBLIC EDUCATION FROM TAX GIVEAWAYS TO
CORPORATIONS 18 (2002).
126 Id. at 15.
127 Id.
128 Hearings, supra note 85, at 2 (opening statement of Sen. Edmund S. Muskie, Chairman, Subcomm.
Intergovernmental Relations).
129 Glenn W. Fisher, History of Property Taxes in the United States, EH.NET (Feb. 1, 2010, 6:21 PM),
http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/fisher.property.tax.history.us
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bring a quantum of greatly needed stability to public school finance. More-
over, additional local revenues could be generated if the limitations were
appropriately modified for school funding purposes. The latter point is of
particular import in light of the political dynamics and economic pressures
that presently characterize state politics, discussed further below.
B. On the State Level
To reiterate, the state role in financing public education continues to be
of compelling importance. On the state level, however, financial difficulty
is not a limitation on state modes of generating revenues. Rather, difficul-
ties for states stem from the broadening spectrum of increasingly expensive
financial demands.130 Although states have rapidly expanded their financial
role in the k-12, states have long played an important role in supporting
public education.13 1 Most recently, rapidly increasing healthcare costs have
placed enormous pressure on state budgets. 13 2 Thus, available data reports
that the most expensive items at present are healthcare and education in that
order.133 These two areas, along with expenditures for higher education,
presently account for more than one-half of most state budgets. 13 4
Systematically meeting these increasing financial challenges has been
difficult for states. As has been noted, states rely principally upon state in-
come taxes, retail sales taxes, or some combination thereof for revenues.
Both of these revenue sources are quite volatile. Legislators attempt to
manage this volatility by making appropriate base or rate adjustments in
these taxes in periods of particular financial stress. However, as a matter of
routine, they are understandably loath to do so. Hence, revenue fluctuation
is inevitable as state economies expand and contract in sync with the na-
tional economy. States are likely to have little control over the ebb and flow
of the larger economy and very limited room for compensatory adjustment
in times of financial exigency. This is especially true if financial fluctuation
is national in scope, as was the case with the most recent recession.
130 NAT'L Assoc. STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT: EXAMINING FISCAL 2010-
2012 STATE SPENDING 1 (2012).
'' Id. at 2 (indicating that from 2010 to 2012, state expenditures for elementary and secondary education
constituted an average of 20 percent of all spending).
132 Id. (indicating that from 2010 to 2012, state expenditures for Medicaid average 23 percent of total
expenditures); see also Report: Health Care Spending Slowdown? Not for States and Localities, PEW
CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.pewstates.org/research/reports/ (last visited Aug. 21,
2013) (finding that health care spending for state and local governments increased 10% in 2011, con-
suming the largest share of state resources than has been the case since 1987 and health care spending
remains a source of fiscal pressure and may double by 2060.)
133 See id.
114 NAT'L Assoc. STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, supra note 130, at 3.
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Moreover, states' ability to anticipate and plan adequately for such fluc-
tuations is quite constrained. With the exception of Vermont, all states must
maintain a balanced budget.135 States thus cannot engage in deficit spending.
"Rainy day funds," essentially state savings accounts, are maintained in
most states and could provide a financial cushion during periods of eco-
nomic exigency.136 However, even where they presently exist, these funds
have not always proven efficacious. Funds must be appropriately structured
with regard to deposits; otherwise, poorly designed rainy day funds would
just become one more demand competing for finite state resources. 13 7 Rainy
day funds are dependent for funding upon the same sources that fund state
services generally. In periods of economic stress, they may be underfunded
and subject to limitations that compromise the extent to which they may be
so used.138 Thus, while creating and maintaining rainy day funds constitute
sound state policy, they cannot be funded in the absence of surplus funds
available for accumulation, or funds designated for that purpose. These de-
posits are a line item within state budgets and are not an exception to the
requirement for a balanced budget. In short, even with regard to manage-
ment of rainy day funds, states are expected to construct balanced budgets
for some predetermined period and to adhere to those budgets.139 If revenue
'35 See NAT'L CONE. STATE LEG., NCSL FISCAL BRIEF: STATE BALANCED BUDGET PROVISIONS 2
(2010). The balanced budget requirement generally speaking applies to appropriations from the state's
general fund, important to recognize in this context since in the vast majority of states the general fund
is the source of state-provided support for public education. Id. at 1. As such, states will not be able to
engage in deficit spending in order to redress any shortfalls in funding for k-12 public education.
Though a balanced budget requirement is not constitutionally-based in all of the forty-nine states subject
to this constraint, the report notes that some combination of constitutional and statutory language com-
pelling (1) required balance in a governor's proposed budget; (2) required balance in the state budget as
enacted; or (3) the inability to carry a budgetary deficit forward from one fiscal period to the next effec-
tively assures this outcome in each such state. In addition to Vermont, Wyoming, North Dakota, and
Alaska are deemed by some scholars to be exceptions to the balanced budget requirement. Id.
136 ELIZABETH MCNICHOL & KWAME BOADI, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, WHY AND
How STATES SHOULD STRENGTHEN THEIR RAINY DAY FUNDS: RECESSION HIGHLIGHTED IMPORTANCE
OF FUNDS AND NEED FOR IMPROVEMENTS 1 (2011). Presently, forty-five states as well as the District of
Columbia maintain a rainy day fund in some form. The five states that do not presently maintain a rainy
day fund are Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Kansas, and Montana. Id.
11 Id. at 13-14 (discussing how general funding would ideally occur during periods of economic expan-
sion - perhaps as a percentage of any revenue surpluses and that this kind of automatic allocation should
be suspended or at least subject to review in order to replenish funds depleted by withdrawals made to
address shortfalls).
' Id. at 1-2 (discussing how most states cap the size of their rainy day at levels that may be too low. As
a result, balances may provide critical funding during shorter-term downturns but may quickly be ex-
hausted when recessionary activity persists over a longer period. Even if adequately funded - 10% or
more of the state budget is a suggested minimum target - procedural or substantive restrictions may lim-
it positive effect. For example, a legislative supermajority may be required before funds can be tapped
for any purpose, or limits may be placed on the extent funds may be used at any one time).
'" See NAT'L CONF. STATE LEG., supra note 135, at 2 ( "Two points can be made with certainty ...
[m]ost states have formal balanced budget requirements with some degree of stringency, and state polit-
ical cultures reinforce the requirements").
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projections are not met, and rainy day funds are unavailable, cuts in antici-
pated funding will follow.
Unlike the cuts recently imposed by national sequestration, state funding
cuts are unlikely to be automatically imposed. Instead, there will likely be
some hearing process for determining and implementing cuts deemed nec-
essary and appropriate. Some state programs may be modified while others
may remain untouched. Some degree of political jockeying is likely inevi-
table when determining and implementing these cuts. State governors may
also become involved in the process, as most states permit governors to ex-
ercise a line-item veto. 140 That power could come into play in this process,
as it does in the regular budgeting process.
To be sure, public education will have its advocates. Realistically, how-
ever, public education will likely be disadvantaged by the political realities
of this process on the state level. Public education simply has not been ac-
corded the primacy that would be likely on the local level, as it must com-
pete with other fiscal priorities for limited state funding. Budget-busters
such as Medicaid and unfunded pension liabilities1 41 now loom very large
on states' fiscal horizons. Unlike the relative power position on the local
level, public schools, for purposes of state politics, become just one more
supplicant competing with other important state initiatives for limited fi-
nancial resources. Given current economic realities, there is little likelihood
of significant additional resources from the state.
VI. THE WAY FORWARD
The parameters of local governance, including all financial matters, are
controlled by state legislatures. States must act if changes are to be made to
public education funding through more strategic reliance on the property
tax.
140 See NAT'L CONF. STATE LEG., TABLE 6.3: GOVERNORS' VETO POWER REGARDING APPROPRIATIONS
LEGISLATION (2008), available at http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/budget/gubernatorial-veto-
authority-with-respect-to-major.aspx.
141 See John W. Schoen, Pandemic of Pension Woes is Plaguing the Nation, CNBC, Aug. 5, 2013,
http://www.cnbc.com/id/100929269. ("A CNBC.com analysis of more than 120 of the nation's largest
state and local pension plans finds they face a wide range of burdens as their aging workforces near re-
tirement." Only seventeen states have funded a majority of their projected pension liability, the rest are
attempting to make up shortfalls).
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A. Protecting Funding for Public Education?
Several ex post protective strategies designed to protect public education
funding against the negative effect of restrictive provisions are presently in
place. First, the failure to protect public education funding has been miti-
gated to some extent by giving to local voters the power to override TELs.
A majority of states that subject school districts to TEL provisions also give
voters in school districts the power through majority vote to override limita-
tions. 142 The few studies conducted, however, report quite limited voter suc-
cess with such efforts. 143 This difficulty is unsurprising in light of changing
demographics. Voters with school-age children no longer constitute a ma-
jority coalition in many school districts. 144 It is one thing for a voter to intel-
lectually support public education as a theoretical matter, and quite another
to support referenda cutting against personal economic interests. Indeed,
limitations may exacerbate preference differences.
As state tax revenues diminish, harder choices will have to be made by
state policymakers. Provisions, such as local voting referenda, may simply
not be enough. For example, and practically, if the twin demographic trends
towards relatively greater childlessness and increasing population age con-
tinue, override provisions may become increasingly of little use for many
identifiable subgroups, including voters with children. The political clout of
persons with school-aged children will wane through sheer lack of numbers.
In this scenario and very superficially, the preferences of an aging demo-
graphic for services of particular interest to them and their families will
likely take precedence for those voters over the need to provide public edu-
cation, a service that may be viewed as only of indirect benefit.
Other provisions are similarly flawed. A few states give schools boards
veto power over property tax abatement or TIF-based diversion - a conces-
sion that at least allows school board input. 145 Again, however, the few stud-
ies available suggest that school boards rarely use the power in defense of
school funding. 146 Finally, an enterprise may agree to make a Payment in
142 See Garry Young et al., Efforts to Override School District Property Tax Limitations, in EROSION OF
THE PROPERTY TAX BASE, supra note 70, at 197 ("...35 states impose some type of TEL on their school
district. However, most (26) of these states provide their local governments with some capacity to over-
ride the limitation, typically through a referendum held among voters in the school district.").
'43 See id., at 217 ( "TEL overrides fail and they fail often.").
'" The most recent census data reports that in 2010 fifty-five percent of family households were child-
less. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 2012 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 56, Table 64 (2012).
145 See NAT'L EDUC. ASS'N, supra note 125, at 3.
146 Id. at 17.
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Lieu of Taxes (PILOT). 147 PILOTs, however, have two shortcomings: they
are voluntary payments, and they rarely fully compensate schools districts
for taxes that might otherwise have been paid. 148 At the end of the day, most
school districts will not be adequately reimbursed (if at all) for revenues
forgone as a result of TIFs or SAPTAPs.
Quite simply, state financial support will likely be critically important for
public schools in property poor districts if those schools are to be adequate-
ly and equitably funded. State financial support for public education has de-
teriorated markedly in recent years. The Center on Budget and Policy Pri-
orities recently reported that thirty-seven states cut funding for schools in
2011, thirty states spent less for their schools in 2011 than in 2007, and sev-
enteen states had made cuts exceeding 10% of pre-recession spending. 149
Some negative measures of the cuts can easily be taken. For example, more
than 250,000 jobs in local school districts have been eliminated since Sep-
tember 2008.150 The extent to which the cuts in funding and personnel un-
dermine education, and education reform in particular, however, is less
easily measured but is likely to be no less real. Compromised educational
opportunities will be inevitable if, as has been reported, teachers are denied
professional support such as opportunities for additional training, class sizes
are increased, and instructional time is either truncated or eliminated."' As
matters presently stand, the property tax is the only source of replacement
for lost state funds. There is little likelihood that the property tax as current-
ly administered can generate significant additional resources. Further, even
if the property tax is restructured as suggested, a revenue gap between
available funds and funds needed for an adequate and equitable education
could remain. For all of these reasons, many school districts will continue
to be compelled to look to the state for financial assistance. Thus, state and
local financial roles must still very much go hand in hand.
Finally, greater financial independence could translate into greater citi-
zen involvement in public education. It has been said that "[t]he obverse of
state centralization is the loss of local control." 15 2 Arguably, then, if loss of
local control has led to civic disengagement in public education, increased
local autonomy could restore that engagement to some extent. Heightened
involvement would not be without risk. Local officials would once again be
called upon to make potentially difficult financial and policy decisions.
147 Id. at 18.
148 Id.
149 OLIFF & LEACHMAN, supra note 32, at 1.
150 Id. at 10.
15 Id. at 12.
152 Sokolow, supra note 120, at 182.
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Taxpayers could once again revolt against higher tax burdens. Tensions be-
tween interest groups with conflicting agendas could also escalate. Despite
the possibility of tensions however, the prospect of improved education
seems worth the risk. The property tax works because, once in place, liabil-
ity cannot be avoided. Real property is immovable. Since liability is certain,
all affected taxpayers have a vested interest in benefits received. Taxpayers
are likely to be more attentive to how public services, including public edu-
cation, are provided and are likely to be vested in the outcomes. Increased
personal liability for funding education grounded in a visible and effective
property tax can ultimately enhance public support for, and interest in, this
extraordinarily important civic enterprise.
However, an important caveat remains. Because of persisting intra-state
funding differentials stemming from variations in the values of underlying
properties in the respective school districts, I am not advocating exclusive
or even primary, reliance on the property tax for funding purposes. Nor do I
suggest the repeal of overall reasonable limitations on, for example, permis-
sible millage rates. States could also continue to provide targeted relief
from the property tax burden for all other purposes as deemed appropriate.
The financial role played by the property tax in funding public education,
however, could and should be more robust than is presently the case for
both financial and civic reasons. The adjustments suggested would promote
the realization of additional funding exclusively for and critical to efficient
and stable school finance. This goal can be accomplished without sacrific-
ing reasonable protections against undue tax burdens for property owners.
VII. STATE + LOCAL GOVERNMENT
EQUALS NINETY PERCENT OF NECESSARY FUNDING
In the years since Rodriguez, states have become much more involved in
the financial support of public education and expenditures supporting public
education have increased sometimes markedly. This expanded role, howev-
er, has brought with it burdens as well as benefits. Expanded support has
resulted in beneficial and additional funding for public education in pros-
perous times. However, most recently during hard economic times, school
districts have had to rely on volatile revenue sources and reduced funding as
states revenues have contracted.
As explained, the volatility in state revenue sources undermines locals'
ability to provide consistent and effective education in the schools. The fi-
nancial ebb and flow has also created increased financial and political pres-
sure. Public education is incontrovertibly an additional big-ticket item and
major administrative responsibility for states. Moreover, oversight is not
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limited merely to finance, but also necessarily includes policy matters such
as the demands of "No Child Left Behind," and a myriad of indirect finan-
cial issues, such as teacher tenure and the management of so-called "failing
schools."153 Financial issues may become conflated with these additional
concerns. Further, financial complexity on the state level extends beyond
funding education. Legislative bodies must also address for example, de-
mands incident to providing healthcare, and properly funding financially
public pension systems. In short, crafting economic policy on the state level
necessarily encompasses numerous pressing matters, in addition to public
education, that compete for limited legislative attention and state revenues.
It is little wonder then that states have freely and without consulting local
governments instituted policies that have worked to the detriment of public
education. As noted, these policies have included property tax relief as in-
centives to targets for economic development. Power has clearly been
usurped by the states. That political dynamic will not be altered in public
education's favor as long as school districts remain more dependent than
may be necessary on state revenues. A revitalized property tax would re-
introduce an additional degree of financial leverage on both the state and
local levels. As such, school districts would enjoy a correspondingly ex-
panded political role in matters related to education in their districts.
A. Reinstating Local Funding Capacity
The present funding challenges provide an opportunity to rethink prior
funding strategies and to design schemes that would extricate the funding of
education from these pervasive limitations once and for all. Providing stable
and adequate funding for public education must be treated as a matter of
utmost importance. States can take a first, important step in this quest by
protecting property tax revenues allocated to support of education from the
entire range of limitations described. The percentage of property tax reve-
nues dedicated to public education should be immunized from limitations of
any kind. To put it differently, support of education must take precedence
over state policies and practices that otherwise undermine tax collections.
As has been explained, those practices include TELs, revenue diversions,
and a plethora of non-income based tax forgiveness programs. Protecting
'53 See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2006); see also SUSANNALOEB & LUKE C.
MILLER, INST. FOR RESEARCH ON EDUC. POLICY & PRACTICE, A REVIEW OF STATE TEACHER POLICIES:
WHAT ARE THEY, WHAT ARE THEIR EFFECTS, AND WHAT ARE THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR SCHOOL
FINANCE? 31 (2006) (discussing various states' tenure policies and how they impact teaching standards
and ability to discipline and dismiss teachers that are not meeting certain standards); James G. Cibulka,
Educational Bankruptcy, Takeovers, and Reconstitution of Failing Schools, 102 Y.B. NAT'L SoC'Y
STUD. OF EDUC. 249, 260-62 (2003) (discussing different approaches in reconstituting schools that are
deemed failing by federal standards set forth in No Child Left Behind).
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support for public education can be accomplished in this fashion even if
limitations are otherwise left in place. This redesign would be a daunting
challenge. Successful redesign, however, could reintroduce to some extent
the stability in funding that is presently missing
B. Reaffirming State Financial Commitment to Public Education
States must first move away from using property tax concessions as a
mechanism for economic growth. This practice compromises local govern-
ment's ability to fund local services, including public education. Even if
such initiatives are successfully undertaken and the state's economy ex-
pands, increased retail sales and individual income tax collections will not
inure to the benefit of the locals; those revenue sources belong to the state.
Ironically, failure to invest in public education could well undermine a
state's ability to invest in one of the assets that contribute to the expansion
of the economy: an educated work force. In short, there is little that recom-
mends broad concessions of this kind.
Even assuming that states move to immunize and stabilize the property
tax, poorer districts will continue to experience difficulty in generating
funds substantially equivalent to those of richer school districts because of
wide variations in the value of districts' taxable property. To remedy this
inevitable difficulty, states must make funding public education from stable,
recurrent sources of revenue a priority. While some reliance on specific
revenue sources might be a means of supplemental funding for education,
states must refrain from too much reliance on such sources. For example,
earmarked excise taxes, such as those levied against tobacco, alcohol, or
gaming, should not be the primary source of funding
Realistically, states will occasionally face periods of financial exigency
over which they have no control. A modified and revitalized property tax
should provide some protection from possible reductions in state support, as
long as recessions are not prolonged. Property tax revenues and state gen-
eral source revenues in combination provide the best hope for stable fund-
ing.
C. Avoiding Dead Ends?
I have suggested that states should insulate the property tax from the ef-
fects of TELs and other limitations to the extent that those revenues are
used to support public education. States should cease to use property taxes
as a bargaining chip in non-educational contexts. Essentially, some percent-
age of property tax revenues would be earmarked for public education. The
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larger question, however, is whether states can or should attempt to engage
in comparable "earmarking" using available funds.
State legislatures have generally refrained from engaging in this kind of
earmarking with regard to general revenues - revenues generated through
retail sales and income taxes. 154 General revenues are available to defray the
overall expenses of the state, irrespective of the manner in which the obliga-
tions arise, general revenues are fungible.
It is less clear whether revenues derived from specific kinds of activity
have been similarly treated as fungible. In recent years, states have expand-
ed revenue collections through a variety of fees, charges, and excise taxes.
The former two categories of collections must generally be used to provide
services to those upon whom the levies are imposed. In comparison, excise
taxes collections have been variously treated.
The most notorious excise taxes are the "sin" taxes: those imposed upon
the sale of alcoholic beverages, tobacco products, and, most recently, gam-
ing.155 All states tax the sale of alcoholic beverages and tobacco products.156
At present, forty states and the District of Columbia use lotteries as a means
of producing revenue. 7 In response to the urging of interest groups, states
may earmark excise taxes collected from the sale of alcoholic beverages or
tobacco products for use in educational programs or to meet increased
health care costs incurred by individuals engaging in those behaviors. Such
initiatives have been relatively few in number. In contrast, earmarking gam-
ing proceeds for support of public education seems to have gained greater
political traction; a number of states presently dedicate at least a portion of
these collections to support public education.' This decision has been driv-
en by economic considerations. Gaming proceeds have seemed to be a
growing source of revenue that, if reliable, could provide a stable and in-
creasing source of funding.15 9
While the use of gaming proceeds in this fashion is still of relatively re-
cent vintage and remains somewhat exceptional, it has already raised a
number of vexing issues. First, there is the question of financial stability. It
154 One exception to this is Virginia, which earmarks a percentage of revenues from its retail sales tax in
order to finance public k-12 education. School Finance, VA. DEP'T OF EDUC., http://www.doe-
.virginia.gov/school finance! (last visited Oct. 4, 2013).
15 I use "gaming" in this context to include both lotteries and casino gambling.
156 NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE LAWS 781-90 (Richard A. Leiter, ed., 6th ed. 2008).
17Id. at 723, 725.
15 This subset of states include California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexi-
co, Ohio, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. Id. at 724-36.
15 See William C. Rivenbark & Bradley B. Rounsaville, The Incidence of Casino Gaming Taxes in Mis-
sissippi: Setting the Stage, 20 PUB. ADMIN. Q. 129, 129 (1996) ("Games of chance," in one variation or
another have been chosen by many state governments as their "economic savior").
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is simply not evident that gaming will continue to be the financial bonanza
for states as it was originally projected to be because as more and more
states enact legislation enabling gaming, overall collections are spread more
thinly. Collections have slowed, if not stagnated, and the aggregate amount
is divided by an increasing number of states.160 Gaming proceeds do not
have the long term financial "heft" that is critical to provide "adequate,"
and certainly not "equitable," public school funding.161 Further, there is the
question of tax incidence: who bears the burden of this tax? The majority of
available studies conclude that the implicit gaming tax, like excise taxes on
alcohol and tobacco, falls disproportionately on less affluent taxpayers. 162 In
other words, these taxes are regressive in effect. The regressive effect may
be offset, however, to the extent that gaming proceeds are earmarked for
public education.
This is a significant point. Earmarking assures poorer individuals bene-
fits from gaming revenues, which is important because the low-income de-
mographic is most heavily engaged in this activity. 163 Essentially, this de-
mographic would self-finance its use of public education. Unfortunately, it
is not clear whether sustained increases in such support have occurred in
states where gaming proceeds are earmarked for public education. More of-
ten, data shows that this source of funding has displaced support that would
otherwise have been provided from general revenues. 164 Further and alarm-
ingly, as gaming proceeds have declined, or costs have increased, general
revenues have not been allocated in order to redress the shortfall. 165 Ear-
marking from excise taxes could be an important way to supplement public
school funding, but it should be no more than that. These studies suggest
16o William Selway & Timothy R. Homan, Lottery Jackpots Are No Sure Thing for Ailing U.S. States as
Sales Decline, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 7, 2011, http://mobile.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-07/jackpots-no-
sure-thing-for-ailing-states-as-lottery-sales-slide.html.
1"' This has led some commentators to characterize lotteries as a "fiscal hoax." The number of lottery
players may be quite high in the early years of a lottery but will receive less and less play as the newness
wears off. States relying on gaming revenues may thus find actual revenues insufficient to cover expens-
es. Rodney E. Stanley & P. Edward French, Can Students Truly Benefit From State Lotteries: A Look at
Lottery Expenditures Towards Education in the American States, 40 Soc. SCI. J. 327, 329 (2003).
162 See Ross Rubenstein & Benjamin Scafidi, Who Pays and Who Benefits? Examining the Distribution-
al Consequences of the Georgia Lottery for Education, LV NAT'L TAX J. 223, 236 (2002) ("[T]he vast
majority of research has found lotteries to be a highly regressive method of raising revenue"); Thomas
A. Garrett, Earmarked Lottery Revenues for Education: ANew Test of Fungibility, 26 J. EDUC. FIN. 219,
237 ("[L]otteries are generally accepted as regressive").
16 Garrett, supra note 162, at 237.
'" The concept of fungibility explains this phenomenon. Lottery monies may replace rather than sup-
plement nonlottery monies previously used to support education, leading one author to conclude that
state lotteries are "robbing Peter to pay Paul." When lottery revenues fall short, legislatures may not
redress the shortfall with nonlottery funds. Several studies have concluded that over time states that had
adopted lotteries earmarking gaming revenues for support of public education actually decreased spend-
ing on education. See Stanley & French, supra, note 161, at 329-30.
165 Id.
32
Richmond Public Interest Law Review, Vol. 17 [2013], Iss. 2, Art. 4
http://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol17/iss2/4
IT TAKES A FEDERALIST VILLAGE
that earmarking excise taxes, as the sole support for public education, is al-
most certainly a questionable policy choice. Revenues from excise taxes
may prove to be a welcome windfall for cash-strapped states appropriate for
ad hoc use. Such revenues, however, should not provide the sole support for
a recurring predictably high-cost expense like public education.
VIII. THE FEDERAL ROLE
A. Funding Everyday Operation
As previously noted, direct federal financial support for schools has been
both limited and earmarked for particular purposes. Despite continuing calls
for an increase in direct, regularized, and unrestricted support, there is little
evidence that such increases will be Congressionally approved. In fact,
given the current Congressional political climate, the contrary is more like-
ly.166 Most observers expect budget debates to dominate federal political
discourse for the foreseeable future.
This possibility of additional federal support might have a different out-
come if indirect support is considered. In a given tax year, individual tax-
payers may have made outlays under circumstances, specifically described
in the Internal Revenue Code of 1984, that cumulatively exceed the stand-
ard deduction amount. 16 7 These taxpayers will be able to deduct that larger
figure in lieu of the standard deduction.168 Under the tax expenditure budget
concept, the ability to deduct these specific amounts is considered a tax
benefit, equivalent to a direct subsidy.16 9 An important source of indirect
support for local government is provided through the Internal Revenue
Code, via the deduction paid or incurred by the taxpayer for specified state
and local taxes (the SALT deduction). 170 The deduction, available since the
inception of the federal income tax in 1913, has historically included the
property tax within the ambit of taxes for which the deduction is allowed. 171
166 See Crampton & Thompson, supra note 31, at 196 ("A new commitment to fiscal austerity at the state
level and a policy shift from fiscal stabilization and economic stimulus to deficit reduction at the federal
level will likely present new challenges to K- 12 education funding.").
167 See I.R.C. §§ 163(h)(mortgage interest on principal residence), 164 (taxes), 170(charitable contribu-
tions), 213 (medical expenses) (1986) (provisions authorizing what have come to be primary deductions
for taxpayers who itemize).
16 See generally, I.R.C. § 63.
169 See Stanley Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: AComparison
with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARv. L. REv. 705 (1970) (complete discussion of the tax
expenditure concept).
170 I.R.C. § 164.
'' CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE DEDUCTIBILITY OF STATE AND LOCAL TAXES, Preface, 2
(2008), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/88xx/doc8843/02-20-
state local tax.pdf.
2014] 581
33
Robinson: It Takes a Federalist Village: A Revitalized Property Tax as the
Published by UR Scholarship Repository, 2013
582 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF THE LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST [Vol. XVII:ii
One commenter estimated that the property tax deduction generated approx-
imately $16.5 billion to $17.1 billion for public k-12 education in 2009 as
then, and currently, structured. 172
There are limitations applicable to the deduction. It is available only to
individual taxpayers who are property owners who have paid the tax and
who itemize when determining tax liability. 173 The majority of individual
taxpayers does not itemize, opting instead to use the standard deduction in
determining taxable income. 174 Thus, the availability of a deduction for
property taxes paid is of no consequence for non-itemizing taxpayers.
The corollary of this last point is important: the inability to deduct fore-
closes the possibility of indirect support for the sub-national governmental
entity. In short, though some percentage of non-itemizers quite likely bears
a property tax burden, non-itemizers receive no subsidy from the federal
fisc through an itemized deduction. They are essentially compelled to treat
any property tax burden as any other nondeductible personal expense. The
expense remains a non-deductible outlay and the cost to the non-itemizing
taxpayer does not constitute a cost to the federal government. In other
words, the more than $16 billion referred to above is exclusive of the prop-
erty tax borne by non-itemizers. Because non-itemizers take no deduction,
liability provides no additional indirect federal expenditure for support of
local government.
An example may be helpful here. Assume three taxpayers: A, B, and C
have each paid $1000 under their local property tax. Taxpayer A is an item-
izer whose income places him in a 15% marginal rate bracket. Taxpayer B
is also an itemizer whose income places her in a 31% marginal rate bracket.
Both are able to deduct $1000 for property taxes paid. Because A is able to
take the deduction, A will not have to pay $150 in income tax. A's property
tax expense has been subsidized by the federal treasury to that extent. In ef-
fect, the federal treasury pays that amount to the subnational taxing entity
on A's behalf. Note, however, that A has still incurred a cost for this bene-
fit: $850 in this case, or the difference between the outlay and the subsidy.
Taxpayer B also receives a subsidy from the treasury, but because B is in a
higher marginal bracket, B's subsidy is greater than that of A. B's subsidy
is $310 and B has incurred a personal cost of $690. Note the "upside-down"
172 See WAYNE C. RIDDLE, CTR. ON EDUC. POL'Y., PUBLIC EDUCATION BENEFITS FROM THE FEDERAL
INCOME TAX DEDUCTION FOR STATE AND LOCAL TAXES AND OTHER SPECIAL PROVISIONs 3 (2011),
available at http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:MI639ppE3WwJ:www.cep-dc.or-
g/cfcontent file.cfm%3FAttachment%3DRiddle Paper TaxExpenditures 41311.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&c
t=clnk&gl=us.
'73 Id. at 1.
'74 Id. at 7 (stating that "[n]ationwide, an average of 33.0% of all individual federal income tax returns
included an itemized deduction for state and local taxes in 2007.").
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effect of the subsidy. If we assume that A has the lower income of the two
taxpayers, the more affluent taxpayer has received the higher subsidy. This
is the reverse of what would be expected through a program providing a di-
rect subsidy. To complete the example, Taxpayer C also incurs a property
tax cost of $1000 but is unable to itemize and cannot take a deduction for
the property tax paid. C is forced to bear the entire cost of the outlay with-
out any subsidy whatsoever. In turn, nothing is paid to the subnational unit
on C's behalf.
It logically follows that support for local government, specifically public
education, could be indirectly increased by expanding, for federal income
tax purposes, the availability of a carefully crafted, favorable treatment for
property tax liability imposed to support public schools. A more universally
available deduction solely for property taxes paid to support public educa-
tion may accomplish this goal.175 Extending the subsidy analogy, the federal
government would indirectly assume a greater share of the cost of providing
public education locally. As such, more generous treatment of this expense
for federal income tax purposes might lessen resistance to property tax in-
creases. Such a deduction may be an administrative challenge to implement
for non-itemizers and could be quite expensive if it were taken without limit
by upper-income, itemizing taxpayers. The example demonstrates this. The
higher marginal rate bracket taxpayer received the higher subsidy.
In contrast, a capped credit for a specified percentage of the tax liability
has much to recommend it. Unlike an income tax deduction, a credit is tak-
en after tentative federal income tax liability has been determined. It is a
dollar-for-dollar reduction of federal tax liability that would otherwise be
borne. The credit would be available to all taxpayers bearing the expense
and would replace the income tax deduction presently available insofar as
property taxes paid to support public education are concerned. Importantly,
all taxpayers eligible for the credit would be equally advantaged, regardless
of income levels. Thus, a capped credit would not result in a disproportion-
ate benefit for more affluent taxpayers and the "upside-down" subsidy ef-
fect would likewise be avoided. Assuming the appropriateness of any pref-
erential treatment for state and local taxes, a credit is also more protective
'1 See generally Darien Shanske, How Less Can be More: Using the Federal Income Tax to Stabilize
State and Local Finance, 31 VA. TAX. REV. 413, (2012). For many of the reasons discussed earlier - i.e.,
lessening volatility and increasing stability - Prof. Darien Shanske urged the federal government to pro-
vide an incentive to states to move to greater reliance on the property tax. Pursuant to his proposal, this
would be accomplished by expanding the deduction for the property tax and limiting or eliminating the
deduction for state income or sale taxes. Unlike what I have proposed here, he recommends an above
the line deduction that could be taken by all taxpayers without itemizing. His proposal also goes to the
deduction for property taxes generally rather than for that percentage allocated for support of public ed-
ucation.
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of the federal fisc.1 76 A credit can be capped at levels deemed appropriate by
federal policy-makers and, as a result, the total cost of a subsidy provided
through a credit can be more easily controlled. A credit differs from an in-
come tax deduction in that the cost of a deduction to the treasury is not easi-
ly contained and, as demonstrated, will be driven by the deduction's value
to the taxpayer. Finally, a capped credit for that percentage of property tax
liability earmarked for support of public k-12 education would communi-
cate a powerful, federal preference use of a stable source of revenue for fi-
nancing this important public good.177
This approach can also provide a mechanism for additional state support.
Forty-three of the fifty states have an income tax on individual incomes in
place.178 These are piggybacked reporting systems. As such, taxpayers de-
termine liability for state income tax purposes under some variant of the
federal statute. 179 Given this parallel, electing states could also permit a tax
credit for property tax paid to support public education against its respective
state liability. Like its federal counterpart, the credit would be a dollar-for-
dollar reduction of state tax liability. Therefore, to the extent that a state
chose to permit this credit, an increase in support indirectly provided
through the state would result.80
To reiterate, additional federal and state financial support for public edu-
cation can be provided indirectly by more expansive treatment of property
tax expenses for the support of public education by taxpayers in their re-
spective school districts. Policy makers on the local, and even state, levels
would determine the levels of liability. The credit would be available for
"6 See generally Martin A. Sullivan, Why the SALT Deduction is Always Under Attack, TAX NoTEs
(Dec. 17, 2012), http://taxprof.typepad.com/files/137tn1261.pdf (providing a brief summary of the case
for retention of the SALT deduction). Perennial talk of tax reform always includes discussion of possible
repeal of some or all of the presently available itemized deductions. The SALT deduction is continuous-
ly and prominently mentioned as a primary candidate for repeal.
' See generally Kirk J. Stark, The Federal Role in State Tax Reform, 30 VA TAX REv. 407, 438 (2010)
(arguing that federal government has unwittingly stacked the deck in favor of state revenue volatility by
permitting the deduction of some state taxes but not others, further suggesting that short of repeal of the
SALT deduction, using a flat rate credit for some or all of the state and local taxes currently deductible).
Stark characterized the property tax as "a relatively stable source of revenue." An approach such as the
one advocated here would be a smaller step away from federal policies that undermine state reliance on
more stable sources of revenue for support of public education.
'7 FED'N OF TAX ADM'RS, STATE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAXES (2013) available at
http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/ind inc.pdf.
179 Stark, supra note 177, at 423.
Iso Professor Stark recently succinctly explained the prevalence of piggybacked state income tax sys-
tems. The groundwork laid by Congress for the individual income and corporate taxes is not replicated
for any other tax. That existing framework along with extensive federal-state cooperation and infor-
mation sharing make irresistible (first) reliance on an income tax system by states and (second) use of
the federal structure to implement the state effort. See Stark, supra note 177, at 424.
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some capped amount of the property taxes paid to support public schools.
This scheme provides additional resources to local school districts through
state and federal governments and, concomitantly, the ability to set policy
on those levels. By the same token, because it is an indirect subsidy, federal
policy would not control the use of funds. The availability of a credit would
also quite likely make increased property tax liability more politically palat-
able for taxpayers. The universally available character of the credit does this
work; the outlay would enable any taxpayer bearing this cost to have it tak-
en into account for tax purposes without the need to itemize on the tax re-
turn. Thus senior, childless, non-itemizing taxpayers could take the credit in
the appropriate amount in addition to the taxpayer in a household that in-
cludes school-aged children. It would be available to all qualifying taxpay-
ers having positive tax liability.
Under a proposal like this one, the treatment of renters is admittedly
problematic. Tax relief for renters is certainly a compelling concern; renters
are likely to bear some part of the cost of the property tax as a pass-through
from landlords. They are also likely as a group to relatively heavily utilize
public schools for their children's educations. A few states have provided a
deduction for renters,181 and this may be an area in which additional states
find it appropriate to provide a comparable deduction or credit for state in-
come tax purposes. Further, an alternative mechanism might be identified
for states without an income tax.
Finally, a comparable approach might be taken for federal tax purposes
for qualifying charitable contributions. The work of The National School
Foundation Association (NSFA) is instructive in this area. Founded in
2002, NSFA's mission aims "to encourage the growth and development of
k-12 foundations among school and districts across the US and Canada."182
NSFA membership includes foundations, not a part of local school district,
but that are "involved in three main activities: raising, handling, and redi-
recting money" in order to support local schools.183 NSFA reports there are
presently more than 4,800 school foundations in the United States. 18 4
Under present law, itemizing taxpayers can make qualifying charitable
deductible contributions to public schools, districts, or foundations. Most
contributions are likely to be made on behalf of schools or school districts
"' Amy Sterling Casil, Tax Deductions for Renting Tenants, HOUSTON CHRON. (2013) available at
http://smallbusiness.chron.com/tax-deductions-renting-tenants-23630.html.
182 Membership, NAT'L SCH. FOUND. Ass'N, http://www.schoolfoundations.org/en/membership/ (last
visited Sept. 23, 2013).
18 Research Findings, NAT'L SCH. FOUND. Ass'N, http://www.schoolfoundations.org/en/resource-
s/research findings.cfm (last visited Sept. 23, 2013).
I84 Id.
2014] 585
37
Robinson: It Takes a Federalist Village: A Revitalized Property Tax as the
Published by UR Scholarship Repository, 2013
586 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF THE LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST [Vol. XVII:ii
in which taxpayers have some personal interest. This deduction might be
tweaked in order to provide an incentive for qualifying contributions to en-
tities other than those in which the taxpayer has a more direct personal in-
terest. For example, a credit against tax liability could be permitted for char-
itable contributions made to foundations or state administered agencies that
serve schools or districts that enroll a disproportionately high percentage of
low-income students. Alternatively, a deduction might only be allowed if
the taxpayer contributes to a fund or to school serving less affluent fami-
lies." A source of funding providing additional support for such schools
would likely be quite useful. Without this kind of incentive for contribution,
supplementary assistance of this kind would almost certainly be unavailable
to poorer districts.
In short, an income tax credit, especially for property taxes, could be
specifically crafted to support public education. This concept could be ex-
tended to include charitable contributions by disinterested donors to funds
designated for the support of officially designated public schools. In both
cases, the credit would be an important way to increase federal funding for
public education without a corresponding increase in federal control or
oversight. The concept could also inform comparable legislation enacted by
states.
As is the case with any indirect expenditure, there could be an additional
cost to the affected treasury if the property tax credit is more broadly avail-
able than the present deduction for property taxes paid. Similarly, a new
credit for designated charitable deduction would carry with it some addi-
tional expense to the federal fisc. Support of public education in this fash-
ion, however, is consistent with the Congressional policy that underlies the
deduction for qualifying state and local taxes in addition to charitable con-
tributions. Allowing the property tax deduction, in either its original or re-
structured form, effectively subsidizes an important state undertaking hav-
ing state constitutional stature. Though this deference is not compelled
under the federal constitution, it is entirely permissible as a matter of poli-
cy. Similarly, Congress provides the charitable deduction as an incentive to
taxpayers to provide support for charitable or educational purposes. Support
of public education as suggested here fits neatly into several of these cate-
gories. Finally, as noted earlier, if properly structured, additional cost to the
federal government could be kept within acceptable bounds.
115 Thanks to my colleague, Michael Doran, for this suggestion.
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B. Federal Financial Assistance During Economic Exigencies
Taxes on income are the primary source of revenue for the government,
generating more than 60% of all revenue.186 As a result of this revenue, in
addition to a variety of excise taxes, the business cycle will affect revenue
ebb and flow at the national level. There is, however, an important differ-
ence between the federal and state governments. Currently, there is no re-
quirement that the federal budget be balanced. As such, in times of reces-
sion, and given its superior access to capital markets, the federal
government can borrow in order to maintain governmental services until the
economy recovers.
The ability to borrow enables the national government to extend financial
assistance to subnational governments during periods of economic exigency
should it choose to do so, just as Congress did during the recent Great Re-
cession.1 7 Approximately $48 billion in State Fiscal Stabilization Funds au-
thorized by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 was
provided to support local education in 2010.18 The obvious difficulty, of
course, is the ad hoc nature of the infusion of funds. There will be no fur-
ther distributions for this purpose. Arguably, however, the federal govern-
ment did precisely what it should do in such circumstances; provide assis-
tance, limited in time and amount, to assist the state and local governments
through a difficult financial period.
IX. CONCLUSION
Public education is arguably the most important service provided by
government and various courts have touted its importance time after time.
The language in Serrano I is illustrative: "[E]ducation is crucial to demo-
cratic government, individual well-being, and individual economic mobili-
ty."18 9 There is little question that an educated populace is critical to an ef-
fectively functioning democratic society. The necessary education cannot
be accomplished without sufficient and stable financial support. All levels
of government must be involved in this effort.
186 The Tax Policy Briefing Book, TAX POL'Y CTR., http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-
book/background/numbers/revenue.cfm (last visited Sept. 23, 2013). This source notes that as of 2010,
individual income taxes accounted for 42% of federal tax revenue in 2010. Id. Historically, the personal
income tax has provided almost half of the federal government's total tax revenue. Id.
' See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009).
8 State Fiscal Stabilization Fund, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. (Mar. 7, 2009), http://www2.ed.gov/po-
licy/gen/leg/recovery/factsheet/stabilization-fund.html.
"' ANNA LUKEMEYER, COURTS AS POLICYMAKERS: SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM LITIGATION 4 (2003).
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Neither school districts nor state governments acting alone possess the
necessary fiscal capacity to meet even the minimal challenge of adequacy.
On the local level, school districts have been deeply disadvantaged by voter
and state imposed limitations on the ability to generate revenues from prop-
erty taxes. As lawmakers for local government, it is incumbent upon state
legislators and policymakers to take steps to reverse the effect of these limi-
tations by rethinking the structuring of economic initiatives. States must re-
frain from imposing limitations, or engaging in initiatives, that undermine
locals' ability to be as self-sufficient as possible. The local property tax re-
mains the best way to raise local revenue for public education. Further, lo-
cal power to impose the tax for this limited purpose should not be abrogated
by TELs, or other measures of overly broad property tax relief. States can
begin the process of revitalizing the tax by crafting economic initiatives that
protect public education from the effects of using property tax diversions or
abatement incident to incentives for development.
Even assuming that states adopt this stance, wide variations in the value
of districts' taxable property will continue to make generating substantial
funding, equal to that provided by richer school districts, impossible for
poorer school districts. State assistance to poorer districts will be critical if
adequate and equitable funding is to be a reality. In providing this support,
states must make funding from general source revenue a priority. While
some earmarking from specific revenue sources might be exploited to sup-
plement funding for education, states must refrain from relying exclusively
on such sources. Earmarking from excise taxes, such as tobacco, alcohol, or
gaming, should not, in any case, be the primary source of funding. Realisti-
cally, states will occasionally face periods of financial exigency over which
they have no control. A modified and revitalized property tax should, how-
ever, provide some protection from possible reductions in state support as
long as recessions are not prolonged.
The assistance of the federal government remains critically important to
achieving stable, efficient funding. Federal assistance for particular purpos-
es, such as that provided through Title I and IDEA, should be continued.
Importantly, as I have demonstrated, additional federal financial assistance
for unrestricted use need not be in the form of direct subsidies; instead, a
credit available to all taxpayers bearing this cost provided through the In-
ternal Revenue Code would work well for this purpose. The credit, espe-
cially in combination with a state level credit, could contribute significantly
to stabilizing revenues over time.
Indeed, treating that part of the property tax liability earmarked for sup-
port of public education as a credit against what would otherwise be income
tax liability would signal a powerful federal preference for reliance on a
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stable source of funding for public education. A credit is also particularly
attractive from the federal point of view in light of Congress' ability to con-
trol its ultimate cost to the federal treasury while simultaneously according
to all taxpayers bearing this cost some message of relief. As such, the credit
could well shore up routine financing and make the cost of supporting pub-
lic education more politically palatable. Finally, the role of the federal gov-
ernment during periods of economic exigency would be clearer. The federal
government would remain a resource for critical support during such peri-
ods of economic stress, as it did subsequent to the Great Recession.
Local, state, and federal governments must act in tandem if meaningful
progress is to be made in stabilizing and increasing funding for education.
The continuing quest for new revenue sources is likely to continue to prove
elusive. That reality does not, however, foreclose the possibility of more ef-
fectively using available funding sources with a reconceived and revitalized
property tax as the linchpin of that effort.
Determining how best to provide stable and effective funding for public
education is undeniably a demanding task. A stable and effective founda-
tion is indispensable to providing a world-class education to American
school children. In the quest to provide a publicly supported education to
American children that is adequate, equitable and second to none, failure is
truly not an option.
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